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ABSTRACT
Social networks are everywhere, from face-to-face activities to online social networks such as Flickr,
YouTube and Facebook. In social networks, ties (relationships) are connections between people. The change
of social relationships over time consequently leads to the evolution of the social network structure. At the
same time, ties serve as carriers to transfer pieces of information from one person to another.
Studying social ties is critical to understanding the fundamental processes behind the network. Although
many studies on social networks have been carried out over the last many decades, most of the work either
used small in-lab datasets, or focused on directly connected static relations while ignoring indirect relations
and the dynamic nature of real networks. Today, because of the emergence of online social networks, more
and more large longitudinal social datasets are becoming available. The available real social datasets are
fundamental to understanding evolution processes of networks in more depth. In this thesis, we study the
role of social ties in dynamic networks using datasets from various domains of online social networks.
Networks, especially social networks often exhibit dual dynamic nature: the structure of the graph
changes (by node and edge insertion and removal), and information flows in the network. Our work focuses
on both aspects of network dynamics. The purpose of this work is to better understand the role of social ties
in network evolution and changes over time, and to determine what social factors help shape individuals’
choices in negative behavior. We first developed a metric that measures the strength of indirectly connected
ties. We validated the accuracy of the measurement of indirect tie metric with real-world social datasets
from four domains.
Another important aspect of my research is the study of edge creation and forecast future graph structure
in time evolving networks. We aim to develop algorithms that explain the edge formation properties and
process which govern the network evolution. We also designed algorithms in the information propagation
process to identify next spreaders several steps ahead, and use them to predict diffusion paths.
vii
Next, because different social ties or social ties in different contexts have different influence between
people, we looked at the influence of social ties in behavior contagion, particularly in a negative behavior
cheating. Our recent work included the study of social factors that motivate or limit the contagion of cheating
in a large real-world online social network. We tested several factors drawn from sociology and psychology
explaining cheating behavior but have remained untested outside of controlled laboratory experiments or
only with small, survey based studies.
In addition, this work analyzed online social networks with large datasets that certain inherent influ-
ences or patterns only emerge or become visible when dealing with massive data. We analyzed the world’s
largest online gaming community, Steam Community, collected data with 3, 148, 289 users and 44, 725, 277
edges. We also made interesting observations of cheating influence that were not observed in previous in-lab
experiments.
Besides providing empirically based understanding of social ties and their influence in evolving networks
at large scales, our work has high practical importance for using social influence to maintain a fair online
community environment, and build systems to detect, prevent, and mitigate undesirable influence.
viii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Everyone is surrounded by social networks, and social ties underlie almost all human endeavor, from
connections between family, coworkers, or friends to the activities of corporate or governmental organi-
zations. A social tie is the connection among people for sharing information, knowledge, feelings, and
experiences [1]. Social ties can be positive (e.g., friendship, work ties), negative (e.g., enemies, aggressive
relations), strong, weak, or latent based on the attributes and the extent of intimacy, frequency of inter-
actions, durability between two individuals. Social ties have the power to influence friendship intimacy,
connect strangers, and shape an individual’s opinions. They are also critical in transitivity in triads, posi-
tions in group structure, and the role of tie strength. Thus, social ties serve as the focal point in the study of
social networks, particularly in social interaction, individual behavior and network changes.
A key element of social network itself is that social networks are not static but rather change over time.
Importantly, ties in these networks often are dynamic, changing in response to the behavior of one’s social
relations. Detailed network studies [2] as well as discussions [3,4] made clear that to obtain a deeper under-
standing of social action and social structure, it is necessary to study the dynamics of individual outcomes
and network structure, and how these interplay with each other. However, because of the mutual influence,
compared to static networks, it is difficult to understand how networks evolve, change, adapt and how they
can be destabilized. For example, the diffusion of information depends on the nature of the information
itself as well as the structure and properties of the social network supporting the diffusion.
Researchers have been trying to answer fundamental questions about complex networks, their ongoing
evolution, formation of internal structures, and change at different time scales. Despite a number of work
have studied social ties [5–7], many aspects of their characteristics and evolution remain unknown, espe-
cially in an evolving environment. First of all, strength of social ties are rather elusive to quantify due to
three facts. First, social ties of individuals are multidimensional, maintaining a large portfolio of different
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types of (in)formal, professional, or romantic relationships. The utilization of only one dimension of a rela-
tion fails to capture accurate tie strength, which makes it easy to overestimate or underestimate the influence
of social ties. Second, social ties are inherently asymmetric [8]. An asymmetric tie means the tie strength
of A → B from A′s perspective is not equal to the strength of tie A ← B from B′s perspective. In other
words, an asymmetric relationship acknowledges that a relationship between two nodes is not necessarily
equal. But we often reduce relationships to simple mutual relations [6]. Third, in real life, we often rely on
friends of our friends for expanding our relationships, finding a new job or getting recommendations. These
friends-of-friends relationships are indirect ties which connection people via intermediaries. Theoretically,
an individual has a number of direct ties and is indirectly tied to everyone (if no disconnected component
exists) in the network but that does not necessarily mean every indirect tie is meaningful to the individual.
As a result, an indirect tie usually spans longer social distance (compared to direct ties), which makes it
much harder to measure. Therefore, to give a fine-grained measure for the strength of a social (in)direct tie
is still an open question.
Next, the dynamic process that gives rise to network autocorrelation has not been sufficiently understood.
Although previous research paid a great deal of attention to the two main topics—structural changes and
information flows—in dynamic networks, far less work has been done on understanding the role of indirect
ties in network evolution.
Finally, the influence of social ties among a group of individuals plays a fundamental role in the spread of
information, ideas, and influence. The virality of positive messages or behavior have trigger rich studies [9–
12] while understanding and quantifying the factors that lead to negative behavior in society is problematic,
due to the inherent desire to hide socially unacceptable actions. Even if significant progress has been made
in the understanding of negative behavior via in-lab experiments, little was measured at scale, in the wild.
My research addresses the above three challenges in the study of social ties in the dynamic process of so-
cial networks. Thus, this thesis naturally breaks into three parts. I designed a new tie strength measurement,
named social strength, which can accurately evaluate both direct and indirect tie strength (Chapter 4). The
role of social ties in the evolving network is discussed in Chapter 5. Specifically, I focus on the influence of
indirect ties in edge creation and information diffusion. I also extend our discussion on how social strength
can be used to solve problems in other systems (Chapter 6). Finally, empirical analysis about social factors
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that drive/limit the spreading of cheating (a specific negative behavior) in an online gaming community is
provided in Chapter 7.
1.1 Measure of Indirect Social Ties
While direct social ties have been intensely studied in the context of computer-mediated social networks,
indirect ties (e.g., friends of friends) have seen little attention. Yet in real life, we often rely on friends of our
friends for recommendations (of good doctors, good schools, or good babysitters), for introduction to a new
job opportunity, and for many other occasional needs. Because of the multidimensional and asymmetric
nature of social ties, accurately measuring an indirect tie is challenging. In this work, we quantify the
strength of indirect social ties using a(ny) measure of the strength of the direct ties that connect two people
and the intuition provided by the sociology literature.
It was observed that interactions among online social network users represent more meaningful relations
than declared ones [13]. Also, sociology studies [14] observed that two individuals have meaningful social
relationships when connected within two social hops and their relationship strength greatly depends on the
number of different direct or indirect paths connecting them. The number of contacts shared by two persons
is a powerful predictor of the probability that one person is aware of the role performance of another [14].
Therefore, to quantify the social strength of a relationship between users A and B, and consequently the
potential trust between them, relationships that are not direct but within a certain number of social hops
could also be considered. We assume a weighted interaction graph model that connects users with edges
weighted based on the intensity of their interaction.
We evaluate the proposed metric by framing it as a link prediction problem and experimentally demon-
strate that our metric accurately predicts link’s formation. By running the metric on different social graphs,
we show that social strength can accurately measure the strength of indirect ties within 3-hop social distance.
1.2 Dynamic Network Analysis and Modeling
In this work, we empirically study the role of indirect ties in the dynamic process in social networks:
new link formation and information diffusion. To make it concrete, we analyzed dynamics with four datasets
augmented with timestamps from different domains, from fast non-profound dynamics to slow professional
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networks and more traditional social networks augmented with heavy interactions. To understand dynamics
in social networks, we quantitatively measured networks in three dimensions: the timing of tie formation,
interaction intensity changes along newly formed ties, and the effect of triadic closure on information diffu-
sion.
We show that the strength of indirect ties can be used to predict the formation of new edges in the social
network. For a further step of edge formation, we studied the “speed” of edge creations, i.e., some edges
formed within a short time while others need much longer time. We defined two simple link delay metrics to
help us quantitatively measure link formation speed in 2- and 3-hop social distance, respectively. In parallel
with edge creation speed, we also compared edge interaction intensity before vs. after edge formation. The
purpose of this comparison is to know whether interaction intensity is a decisive factor leading to close
a tie, and whether people continue maintaining their newly formed relationships. During our analysis, in
order to distinguish an individual’s strong ties from weak ones, we developed an straightforward method to
divide the strength of ties. We show that a strong indirect tie correlates to more direct interactions after link
formation when compared to pairs with weak indirect ties.
Finally, direct ties were shown to be an influence in social contagion [15] while little study has been done
on utilizing indirect ties to find the next potential adopter or the possible diffusion paths. Along the way,
we proposed a method based on our proposed social strength metric to find the adopters several steps ahead.
By calibrating our prediction method with four different social networks, and comparing our prediction
results with ground truth that were generated from the Linear Threshold model, we show that the strength
of indirect ties can serve as a predictor for diffusion paths.
1.3 Social Influence in Contagion of Cheating Behavior
The unethical behavior of cheating has been a well-known problem in our real life. Understanding
and quantifying the factors that lead to cheating in society is deficient, due to privacy restrictions of data
collection and people’s reluctancy to share or admit their cheating actions. The inherent factors that motivate
cheating and its contagion have remained untested outside of controlled laboratory experiments and small,
survey-based studies. In this work we collected a large-scale dataset that includes a significant number of
instances of cheating behavior from Steam Community, the world’s most popular online gaming platform.
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By analyzing cheating in online games, we verified at scale and in the wild a number of previous observations
drew from sociology and psychology [16, 17] and our previous work [18].
First, we extended previous work of cheating in online gaming from the friendship network [18] to an
interaction-based co-match network, and confirmed cheating as a social contagion in the interaction net-
work as well. But we observed a different contagion process by looking at the interaction network, a more
likely platform for cheating contagion to happen. Second, empirical analysis helps us confirm that observ-
ing neighbors who cheat but have not been punished and observing in-group contacts can positively drive
cheating engagement. On the contrary, penalty for cheating and social class limit the spread of cheating.
Besides providing empirically-based understanding of cheating behavior at large scale, our work has high
practical importance for maintaining a fair community environment and building systems to detect, prevent,
and mitigate unethical behavior.
1.4 Contributions
In this dissertation, there are five key contributions to the study of social ties in dynamic networks.
1. We introduced a social strength metric to quantify the strength of indirect social ties by considering
both the intensity of interactions and the number of connected paths. By comparing with several
widely-used metrics in literature, we showed three advantages of our social strength metric over other
metrics. We also validate that social strength metric is an accurate quantification of the intensity of an
indirect social relationship by reframing the proof into a link prediction problem.
2. We defined two simple metrics to measure link delays and discovered that link delays negatively
correlate to the tie strength. We also developed a straightforward method to distinguish strong and
weak ties in the link formation process on 2- and 3-hop social distance and found that after users
form a direct link, their interactions not only continue but also increase, implying that users actively
maintain their newly formed relationship and this maintenance positively correlate to tie strength.
3. Using simulations and Twitter information diffusion datasets, we showed that indirect ties are not only
a critical factor that cannot be neglected in information diffusion (or social contagion), but also a good
predictor for finding diffusion paths.
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4. We developed a social strength-based peer selection algorithm for data placement in friend-like peer-
to-peer systems. We showed that the social strength-based mechanism more than doubles the set
of storage candidates motivated by social incentives, invites socially low connected users to con-
tribute more resources, and improves data availability by up to 6.5 times. We also showed that our
method complemented with simple load balancing strategies significantly improves peer engagement
and workload distribution.
5. Our analysis of Steam Community network, an online gaming network that records cheating behav-
ior, showed that the interaction-based network serves as a channel for cheating contagion. Besides
confirming several observations from controlled, in-lab experiments with our large empirical data, we
quantitatively measured the influence of penalty and social classes for limiting or driving cheating
propagation.
1.5 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation is organized into eight chapters, including the Introduction. Chapter 2 provides back-
ground information about social networks, graph theory, dynamic networks and applications. In Chapter 3
we describe all datasets used in the following chapters, summarizing their attributes and presenting distribu-
tion patterns. Chapter 4 contains a description of the definition of social strength metric, and a validation of
the metric. Chapter 5 discusses the role of social strength in dynamic networks from three perspectives. The
corresponding methods and experiment design choices that go into creating the procedure are also described.
Chapter 7 gives an example on applying social strength to friend-to-friend distributed systems. Chapter 6
continues discussing the influence of social ties in dynamic networks but moves to a specific topic—cheating
contagion. Limitations of the data and experiment designs are also discussed. At the end of this dissertation,
we summarize the work, and discuss future directions in Chapter 8.
6
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW1
The studies of the role of social ties in dynamic networks include four essential elements:(1) social
ties and their measurements, (2) graph theory, (3) network’s structural evolution and (4) the mechanism of
diffusion processes. This chapter summarizes and reviews existing literatures on each part. We also survey
the basic concepts and terminologies of social network analysis, network properties, and applications built
upon social ties but closely relate to this thesis.
2.1 Social Networks and Properties
A social network is a set of people connected by social relationships such as friendships, co-authorships
or information exchange. Social network analysis (SNA) focuses on finding patterns of relations among
people, tracing the flow of information and seeking reasons behind behavior and attitudes of network mem-
bers like what affects the relation? or how do we explain the word-of-mouth phenomenon. SNA is not a
formal theory in sociology but rather a strategy to study social structures through graphs or networks [20].
A social network is formally represented by a graph where nodes in the network represent people and links
are relationships or flows between nodes that can be either directed or undirected. The neighborhood of a
node is the set of nodes that it connects to.
Today, with hundreds of millions of users worldwide, online social networks like Twitter, Facebook, and
Flickr provide incredible opportunities for connecting people and facilitating social interactions. Many such
virtual worlds have become increasingly lifelike. Meanwhile, massive amounts of user information (e.g.,
personal interests, likes and dislikes) are recorded in multiple contexts, providing a “virtual laboratory” to
observe and analyze social problems at scale and at a level of detail that has never been possible before.
1Some of the work in this chapter will be published in [19].
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2.1.1 Network Properties
A social network can be represented as a graph G = (V,E) where a vertex set V denotes people and an
edge set E represents social relationships.
• Directed and undirected graph: Directed and undirected graphs are two basic graphs widely-used in
social network analysis. A graph is directed if all edges between nodes are ordered, and edges are
bidirectional in undirected graphs.
• Connected component: A connected component in undirected graph is a subgraph in which any two
vertices have a path between them. Similarly, there exist weakly and strongly connected components
in directed graphs.
• Diameter: is the length of the shortest path between the most distanced nodes.
D = max L(u, v)
where L(u, v) is the length of the shortest distance between node u and v.
• Average path length: is the average distance between any two nodes in the network.
Average path length =
∑
u≥v L(u, v)
En
where En (equals to
n(n−1)
2 ) is the total number of edges in a complete graph with n nodes.
• Degree Distributions: The degree of a node in undirected graphs is the number of links to the node.
For directed graphs, a node’s in-degree is defined as the number of edges pointing towards the node,
and out-degree is the number of edges pointing from the node. The degree distribution of a network
is the probability distribution of degrees of the whole network. Many networks’ degree distribution
follows a power-law distribution. A distribution is a power-law distribution if it follows the form :
p(x) ∝ x−α
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where α is the exponent parameter typically ranges in (2, 3), and p(x) is the probability of variable
x. Even if power-law degree distributions were observed in many empirical online social network
data [21], few of them follow power law for all values of x. More often, only the tail (when x values
are greater than some minimum xmin) of the distribution obeys a power law [22]. Sometimes a
power-law distribution is called a scale-free distribution in that most nodes have a few connections
while some have a large number of connections. In this sense, the network has no scale [23].
• Community Structure: Graph communities have a structural feature that nodes can be grouped into
groups of nodes that are tightly connected inside the same group while loosely connected between
groups. Thus, people within the same community have stronger social closeness than people from
different communities. For example, communities in a co-authorship network represent different
research areas [24] while within each community authors share similar research interests. To identify
communities, various community detection algorithms have been proposed [25] in literature. The
community structure helps in understanding of interactions among group of individuals during social
dynamics. For example, the spread of information within the community vs. between communities.
• Triads and Clustering Coefficient: A triad is a group of three nodes and possible edges between them.
Clustering coefficient is a measure of transitivity of the network, and transitivity depends on triads
(triangles). If a graph (G) represents relationship among people, the clustering coefficient is also
referred as network transitivity that measures the extent that a friend of my friend is more likely to
be my friend. There exist two versions of the measurement: the local and the global. Watts and
Strogatz [26] define local clustering coefficient of C(i) as:
C(i) =
2T (i)
ki(ki − 1)
where ki is node i′s degree and T (i) is the number of triangles that node i resides in. It is the ratio
of the number of edges of node i′s neighbors relative to the maximum number of edges that could
possibly exist between node i′s neighbors. The global clustering coefficient is based on node triangles:
CC(G) =
3× number of triangles
number of connected triples of nodes
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As an alternative of the global clustering coefficient, a graph’s average clustering coefficient is mea-
sured by the mean of the local clustering coefficient of all the nodes in the graph.
CC(G) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ci
where Ci is the local clustering coefficient of vertex i. Note this definition is valid if and only if node
i′s degree is greater than 2.
• Small World Phenomenon: Watts and Strogatz [26] defined a family of networks that exhibit two
properties: (1) the average shortest path length is small and (2) the clustering coefficient is higher
than the corresponding random network. The former property shows that the average node-to-node
distance is small. The latter property indicates that nodes tend to cluster together, forming dense
complete triads.
Kleinberg [27] proposed a navigable small-world model that is the base of many small-world-based
P2P overlays. The model adds long links with linking probability according to the length of the link,
turning a 2D mesh network into a small-world network. Recent studies [21] confirmed that the small-
world phenomenon also exists in online social networks (not only in real-life social networks). For
example, the clustering coefficients of Orkut, Flicker, LiveJournal and YouTube are between 3 and 5
orders of magnitude higher than the clustering coefficients of their corresponding random graphs with
the same number of nodes and links. All of these networks have remarkably short diameters.
The small-world property is related to mixing speed that is evaluated by mixing time. Mixing time
measures how fast a random walk in a graph reaches the “stationary distribution” [28] (where nodes
are roughly independent from the starting point). Graphs with fast mixing time indicate that any
arbitrary destination in the graph is reachable with a probability proportional to the node’s degree.
Conversely, a connected graph with a small quotient cut should have a large mixing time [29]. A fast
mixing graph is necessarily a small world while the opposite is not true [30]. Even if short paths exist
in small-world graphs, random walks over such graphs can often remain confined to local clusters,
which results in longer mixing time. For a small-world graph to be fast mixing, it has to contain
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a substantial percentage of bridges that connect different clusters. In this way, random walks have
higher probability to move from one cluster to another, thus decreasing mixing time.
2.2 Social Ties
Social ties are defined as the set of connections between individuals [7]. Mark Granovetter introduced
the concept of tie strength in [5]. He characterized two types of ties: strong ties are tightly clustered and
include close friends and family; weak ties typically connect acquaintances or distant friends. Strong ties are
individually more influential. Their removal disintegrates the local community. Recent studies have shown
that people whose social circles overlap are likely connected by strong ties [6]. Weak ties, however, have the
benefit of spreading new information between different communities [31]. In social graphs, removing weak
ties will delete the links that connect different communities, possibly leading to network disconnection.
In sociology, two theories are closely related to the properties of social ties. First, the theory of ho-
mophily [32] postulates that people tend to form ties with others who have similar characteristics. In social
contexts, people are likely to make friends with like-minded individuals and sometimes even adopt their
friends’ behaviors and activities [33]. Moreover, a stronger relationship implies greater similarity [5].
Second, the principle of triadic closure [34] states that two users with a common friend are likely to
become friends in the near future. The triadic closure has been demonstrated as a fundamental principle
for social network dynamics. For example, Kossinets and Watts [35] showed how it amplifies homophily
patterns by studying the triadic closure in e-mail relations among college student. Kleinbaum [36] found
that persons with atypical careers in a large firm tend to lack triadic closure in their email communication
network and so have their brokerage opportunities enhanced.
2.2.1 Measures of Tie Strength
Ties differ widely in content and intensity. As social ties grow and change over time via the addition of
new edges and new interactions in the underlying social structure, understanding how to measure tie strength
is the foundation to understand the mechanisms behind the evolution.
Since Granovetter introduced the notion of strength of ties in social networks [5], there have been many
studies on tie strength measurement. Gilbert and Karahalios [6] modeled tie strength as a combination of
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social dimensions such as intensity, intimacy, duration, and structure. Crandall et al. [37] investigated the
existence of social ties between people from co-occurrence in time and space on Flickr and discovered that
even a small number of co-occurrences indicate a high probability of an existing tie between two users.
Likewise, Kahanda and Neville [38] developed a supervised learning predictor that classifies a link in OSNs
as either a weak or strong tie via features from user profiles, graph topology, transactional connectivity and
network-transactional connectivity features.
In the following, we survey the most popular methods of tie strength measurement based on neighbor-
hood in graph, which are also the main metrics compared with our social strength metric in Chapter 4. For a
node A, other nodes to whom A connects are called the neighbor set of A in the graph. Formally, Neighbors
(A) denotes the set ofA′s neighbors. A number of approaches are based on the idea that two nodesA andB
have stronger ties if their neighborhoods overlap. This also follows the intuition that two people with many
contacts in common present closer relationships than if they don’t share any contacts.
• Common Neighbors [39] is the simplest measure of tie strength between two nodes. It is equal to the
total number of neighbors two nodes share. The metric was quantitatively verified in the context of
collaboration networks by Newman [40].
CN(A,B) = Neighbors(A) ∩Neighbors(B)
• Jaccard Coefficient [41] is a widely used similarity metric that refines common neighbors definition
by normalizing how “close” A and B are.
JC(A,B) =
|Neighbors(A) ∩Neighbors(B)|
|Neighbors(A) ∪Neighbors(B)|
• Adamic Adar [42] is also a refined definition of common neighbors. Instead of simply counting
neighbors, it weighs two nodes’ shared neighbors with their degrees.
AA(A,B) =
∑
z∈Neighbors(A)∩Neighbors(B)
1
log|Γ(z)|
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• Preferential Attachment [43] is empirically verified by Newman [39] and Barabasi [44] with a co-
authorship network. It expresses that the relationship between A and B is correlated with the product
of the number of their individual neighbors.
PA(A,B) = |Neighbors(A)|.|Neighbors(B)|
• Katz [45] counts the number of paths from A to B with each path exponential discounting by length
to weight short paths more heavily. It is parametrized by a constant β(0 ≤ β ≤ 1).
Katz(A,B) =
∞∑
l=1
βl · |P lA,B|
Here, P lA,B is the set of all length− l paths between A and B.
However, these tie strength measurements have three drawbacks. First, most of the metrics fail to eval-
uate tie strength that is more than 2-hop away. Second, they either need extra information (e.g., users’
profiles, the message content or users’ geo-locations) or adopt complex models that cannot be implemented
in a decentralized fashion. Third, most previous methodologies simply treat users’ relationships symmetri-
cally. Without asymmetric discrimination, it is difficult to accurately capture the strength of social ties [46].
In Chapter 4, I provide an indirect tie metric that can measure tie strength on any social distance, only needs
graph topology information, and can be implemented in a decentralized fashion.
2.3 The Dynamics of Social Networks
Many of social network analyses were performed on static graphs whereas most real-world graphs are
evolving in nature. Social networks often exhibit dual dynamic nature: the network topology changes over
time (nodes and edges come and go), and information, ideas or behavior adoption spreads in the network,
leading to node status/attributes changes (from not inactive to active in the information diffusion process).
These two types of dynamic processes can be affecting each other. The mining of the huge corpus of social
data now available in digital format has led to significant advances of our understanding of the evolving
network, and confirmed long standing results from sociology on large datasets. Lately, numerous large
13
online social networks have provided unprecedented opportunities to study the dynamics of networks. Thus,
a lot of studies in computer science have examined the evolution of groups or analyzed membership and
relationship dynamics in these networks. For example, Backstrom et al. [47] analyze how communities
or groups evolve over time, and how a community dies or falls apart [48]. Others examined the diffusion
of information and innovations and the spread of epidemics and behaviors [49]. In this thesis, my work
includes both of structural evolution and the diffusion process in dynamic networks.
2.3.1 Structural Evolution
In a social graph, individual node arrival and edge creation processes lead to graph structure changes.
The mainstream method to study network evolution is taking snapshots of the graph at different time points
and use these snapshots to make inferences about the evolutionary process. We briefly outline some of the
work in this area.
Preferential Attachment (PA) is a “rich get richer” principle in the edge creation process. When new
nodes join the network, they choose a destination node to form an edge proportionally to their degree.
In parallel, triadic closure is another principle that can not be ignored in edge formation. That is, if two
nodes share neighbors, there is an increased likelihood that these two nodes will form an edge in the future.
Accordingly, in Chapter 5, we supplemented previous edge formation studies from an indirect tie’s angle,
referring to questions like edge formation delays and the relation between speed of edge formation and
interaction intensity. Overall, an entire network has increased average degree and total number of links due
to arrival of new nodes but decreased clustering coefficients over time [44].
Diameter, the length of the shortest path between the most distanced nodes, as an important measurement
of graph changes was well examined in literature. In general, a graph’s diameter evolves in several steps. At
beginning, the diameter of giant component looks flat; later as the edge density drops, the diameter shows an
upward trend and reaches its peak; in the final stage, when the edge density starts increasing, the diameter
drops. The shrinking diameter phenomenon was observed in Flickr, Yahoo! 360, ArXiv citation Email and
etc. time-graphs [50, 51] in dynamic networks.
A community (or group) is a structure that gathers nodes into it such that there is a higher density of
edges within groups and a few between them. When time-stamped data is available, many works try to
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answer the question of how communities or groups evolve over time. For example, Leskovec et al. [52]
revealed that in the early stage communities are small and their clustering coefficients increases over time.
Backstrom et al. [53] studied group memberships, growth and changes with two social networks (DBLP
and LiveJournal) and found that group neighbors connection structure influences users’ decision to join a
group. In addition, if a group has a high triangle density, the group is unlikely to grow further. In contrast,
Patil et al. [48] looked at the final stage of group evolution, i.e., what factors contribute to the stability of a
group. The active number of members and users’ social activities play important roles in maintaining group
stability. The same as diameter shrinking, groups also shrink if members depart or seldom participate in the
groups’ activities. A community grows in two ways: diffusion-based and non-diffusion growths [54]. In the
diffusion-based growth people are influenced by their social ties to join the community, and such influence
may require diverse ties in the community. Non-diffusion growth has more random factors to drive users
join the community, which is important to create large communities.
Motivated by the above empirical observations of network evolution, a series of graph generation mod-
els were proposed to mimic node arrivals, edge formation, and edge destination selections of real networks.
The earliest random graph model, Erdos-Renyi model [55], posits that each pair of nodes have identical
probability to be connected by an edge. This model built the foundation for graph theory but fails to match
real-world networks in many aspects. The discovery of power-law degree distribution has led to the devel-
opment of the family of models based on preferential attachment to exhibit such degree distribution. Nodes
arrive at random but edges are not placed uniformly at random. A new node creates edges proportionally to
its degree.
More extensive surveys of the topic of networks structural properties can be found in [56–59].
2.3.2 Diffusion Process
Social phenomena like fads, information, events and adoption of behaviors can spread through networks
of people [60]. In the spreading process, people are influenced by one another for the imitative action of
another. This phenomena is called social contagion. Social contagion is another perspective to study the
dynamic, temporal process of social networks. In this thesis, we focus on two types of social contagion,
information diffusion and behavioral contagion.
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2.3.2.1 Information Diffusion
Social networks as a channel for people to share information have been studied extensively in the context
of information diffusion, especially the role of tie strength in diffusion. Aral et at. [61] pointed out that
whether or not information is delivered through a tie depends on the tradeoff between structure diversity and
“bandwidth” (interaction frequency). Grabowicz [62] empirically observed that intermediary social ties are
a vital component in information diffusion of online social networks. Bakshy et al. [11] compared the role of
strong and weak ties in information propagation and found that weak ties dominate the propagation process
instead of strong ties that were originally believed. Levin et al. [63] surveyed three companies to prove
that weak ties, providing access to non-redundant information, are more useful for information diffusion.
Although most of these studies concentrated on directly connected social ties, they provide foundations for
our study and motivate us to investigate the relationship between indirect ties and information diffusion.
Based on the role of social ties in information diffusion, various graph-based models were proposed to
simulate the diffusion process. The Linear Threshold (LT) and Independent Cascade (IC) Models are two of
the most basic and widely-used diffusion models, and many advanced models are extended from them. We
briefly review these two models in the following.
• Linear Threshold (LT) Model: is a threshold-based predictive model where each node in the network
needs a threshold θ (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1) and an edge weight w between the node and its neighbor. A node (v)
is activated, if its total weight of active neighbors is at least θv, that is
∑
w∈Neighv wv,w ≥ θv.
• Independent Cascade (IC) Model: for each iteration, the activated node u try to activate its neighbor
v, then node v has probability of pu,v to adopt. pu,v could be defined as the outcome of random event
as being determined by flipping a coin. Other methods of the edge probability definition can also be
found in [64].
They are both based on directed graphs where nodes can be active or inactive. For both models, the
diffusion process proceeds iteratively along time-based paths, beginning from a set of early adopters (users
who are the first to adopt the information and trigger the diffusion). IC needs a diffusion probability with
each edge whereas requires a threshold associated to each node.
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Generally speaking, the structure of the underlying network also has an impact on the propagation
process in the network [65–68]. Most of diffusions are small and shallow [69], and hubs (nodes with
extremely large degree), were known to have lower visibility, act as firewalls (epidemics die out when
reaching a hub) to information spread [70–73]. As a result, hubs are rarely the adopters in the process of
diffusion. In addition, another important network structure in information diffusion is community [24, 74–
76]. Community structure is believed to play a negative role in the spread of ideas [5, 75, 77–79]. Messages
passed within a community tend to be redundant and community members have higher similarity, therefore
lack of novelty. Insufficient novelty further lowers people’s incentives to spread information.
2.3.2.2 Behavioral Contagion
Behavioral contagion is a type of social influence in which one individual influences another’s cognition
and behavior [80]. One particular characteristic of contagious behavior is the correlation between the num-
ber of exposed contacts engaging in a behavior and the probability of observers adopting the behavior. This
positive correlation has been observed in many social contexts, such as the joining LiveJournal groups [81],
the bookmarking of photos [82], and the adoption of cheating in online gaming community [83].
Behavioral contagion is typically unlike not like disease or information contagion. Most of informa-
tion and disease contagions are simple contagions, which means a single exposure is enough to trigger a
spread. Thus, a single tie is sufficient to propagate an epidemic to a remote region of the network [84, 85].
A complex contagion requires multiple sources of contact for the spread of contagion. Note that multiple
exposures and exposure to multiple sources have subtle differences. In simple contagion, each contact with
the same infected individual counts as an additional exposure. In contrast, in complex contagion, since a
single active individual is not enough to trigger an adoption, multiple sources of activation are required.
Centola and Macy [84] and Romero et al. [86] showed that complex contagions exhibit more diverse diffu-
sion patterns than simple contagions. For example, the over-exposure phenomenon (increases in exposure
suppress contagion [87]) is seldom observed in single contagion but widely exists in complex contagion.
Ghasemiesfeh et al. [85] empirically showed that weak ties play an important role in spreading of simple
contagions while are less important in complex contagions because of lacking multiple active neighbors at
the same time. Simple contagions benefits from long and narrow bridges for spreading information. While
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complex contagions heavily rely on the wide bridges (number of short paths between non-neighbors) rather
than the length of the bridge to transmit strong social reinforcement.
Unethical behavior, as a typical social behavior, is defined as a harmful, illegal or morally unacceptable
behavior toward others in the larger community [46]. It has been studied in psychology and sociology.
It covers a variety of negative behavior, such as toxic behavior [88], cheating, trolling [89], griefing [90],
etc. Unethical behavior can cause far reaching problems for society, spurring a rich research on the topic.
Meanwhile, the decision making shown in unethical behavior involves complex factors than span from the
individual to society as a whole. Some studies have assumed that the characteristics of the individual are
the primary force influencing unethical behavior. For example, Kahn [91] investigated factors involving
the individual, such as cognitive morals, that inform people what they ought to do and that may influence
unethical behavior. Others emphasized the importance of environmental and societal attributes in unethical
behavior. Kulik et al. [92] discovered that competitive environments act as a catalyst for the emergence and
spreading of unethical behavior. Hegarty et al. [93] and Trevino et al. [17, 94] demonstrated that reward
systems, societal norms, values and culture are the factors that contribute to the prevalence of unethical
behavior. Bass et al. [46] argued that unethical behavior is a social phenomenon that individuals’ embedded
social relationships (strength, status and asymmetry) and structural positions (structural holes, centrality and
density) affect the contagion and conspiracy of unethical behavior.
Cheating as a specific unethical behavior has been a topic of interest from sociology and psychology to
computer science. McCabe et al. [95] studied cheating in academic institutions and found that even if both
individual and contextual factors have influence on cheating, contextual factors like peers’ behavior are the
most powerful influence. Gino et al. [96] conducted a group of controlled experiments to test the effects of
different factors in cheating, which inspired our work presented in Chapter 7. Piff et at. [16] revealed that
people in higher social classes are more likely to cheat than people in lower classes. Blackburn et al. [18,83]
discovered that cheaters in online gaming worlds are well embedded in the social networks, and a fair player
is more likely to become a cheater himself if he has more cheater friends. Much harder to catch in real life,
studying cheating and its contagion in online world, where all interactions leave a digital mark, becomes a
promising approach for understanding social contagion in real life. Motivated by this fact, in Chapter 7, by
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using a large dataset from an online gaming world, we studied factors that drive/limit people to cheat but
have remained untested outside of controlled laboratory experiments.
2.4 Application of Social Ties in Decentralized Systems
Social ties (mainly relating people via declared relationships on online social networks or via computer-
mediated interactions) has been successfully used for a variety of applications, from spam filtering [97]
to recommendations [98] and peer-to-peer backup systems [99]. Recent research started leveraging social
ties to develop new and effective techniques in a variety of areas while this thesis focuses on friendship
based Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems. In such systems, peers are treated as participants in social networks; the
formation of P2P overlays is informed by the user’s social ties, declared or inferred. Friend-to-Friend (F2F)
category’s direct connections are made only between peers corresponding to users socially connected. The
recent availability of knowledge about user’s social relationships and interactions, made prevalent by social
applications and Online Social Networks (OSNs)–such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Foursquare–provides
the real-life information about the social structure of the user base and thus enables the implementation of
many such applications.
As F2F systems built upon P2P infrastructure, the following section provides the background needed for
contextualizing the work, especially Chapter 5, in the thesis.
2.4.1 An Overview of P2P Systems
The P2P design philosophy relies on individual computers’ CPU cycles, communication and storage
capacity to enable access to a large pool of resources that self-organize. The P2P architecture hence has
the potential to enhance reliability and fault tolerance because of its independence from dedicated servers
and centralized control. For example, a P2P Voice-over-IP (VoIP) network can initiate and receive voice
calls to or from another peer without relying on centralized servers that can become overloaded. Because
of this autonomy, P2P techniques were deployed in commercial applications such as cloud storage sys-
tems (Space Monkey [100] and Symform [101]), Content Delivery Networks (e.g., PeerCDN [102]), Voice
over IP (Skype [103], etc), Video on Demand ( [104]), file sharing (Kazaa [105], etc) and many others.
In addition, researchers continue to expand their investigations into the applicability of P2P techniques to
19
other application areas. For instance, P2P-based massive multiplayer online gaming systems [106–108] are
promising due to reduced deployment and maintenance costs when compared to centralized game servers.
Most recently, P2P approaches have been introduced into smart phones, driving innovative user experiences
in mobile. AllJoyn [109, 110], as a typical example, provides a framework that enables proximity-based
device-to-device communication that connects people in real-time without a server. This framework sup-
ports various mobile applications, from media sharing, social networking to entertainment and productivity
tools.
The P2P architecture has been positioned as an alternative to the traditional client-server architecture. In
general P2P systems, each node is managed by an independent entity, and without a central authority, nodes
form self-organizing and self-maintaining networks. In most cases, nodes are assumed to have equivalent
roles. The P2P overlay, a key component in P2P systems, provides mechanisms for message routing, node
membership management, node lookup, etc. Based on the topology of the overlay, P2P systems are typi-
cally classified as structured or unstructured. Hybrid topologies that include centralized and decentralized
control are better known as super-peer architectures. In such topologies, some nodes (the super peers) exert
centralized control over a small number of peers, while being connected among themselves via a structured
or unstructured topology.
Several reasons account for the attractiveness of the P2P model. First, little or no administrative in-
tervention is needed to maintain the system. Second, P2P networks are resilient in the face of faults and
attacks, because no single node is critical to the system’s operation, and a small number of node failures
do not affect the performance of the entire system. Therefore, to attack or shut down a P2P system, an
attacker must simultaneously target a large proportion of nodes. Third, in some scenarios, P2P systems have
potential for good load balancing due to their decentralized character, which means that no node will act as
a server to serve all requests from other nodes. Fourth, popular P2P systems have an abundance of diverse
resources that few organizations are able to afford [111]. The resources tend to be diverse in terms of their
hardware, software, geographic location, and network services. This diversity reduces the system’s vulner-
ability to correlated failures, attacks, and even censorship. More detailed presentations of P2P systems and
their underlying mechanisms are found in literature surveys such as [112–114].
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2.4.2 Social Incentives Encourage Cooperation
P2P systems rely on voluntary resources contributed by individual peers and the cooperation among
users. In these systems, users have implicit disincentives to cooperate because cooperation consumes their
own resources (e.g., bandwidth and disk space) which may degrade their own performance. In the absence of
appropriate incentives, P2P systems are plagued with free-riding [115] and churn [116] at levels higher than
socially informed P2P systems [99,117]. For example, an early Gnutella study [118] shows that almost 70%
of users are free-riders, and the top 1% contributing peers return 50% of all search results. If a contributing
peer leaves, others may be negatively affected by poor quality of service, increased overhead, or end-to-end
latency.
Meanwhile, studies have confirmed the real-life fact that people are more generous toward friends [119]
and towards the closest people in their social circle [120]. This inherent generosity towards existing so-
cial contacts has been tapped for sustainable cooperation in distributed systems. For example, declared
friendships on Orkut [121], or shared photo interests in Flickr [122] have been utilized as social incentive
mechanisms. In the following, we describe some P2P systems that leverage social incentives to improve the
performance of systems.
Because of the above two reasons, F2F systems were designed to solve the lacking of incentives in P2P
networks but still preserve the decentralized advantages. The F2F storage system [99] gives peers the choice
of storing data on their friends’ computers. This approach exploits users’ embedded incentives to help their
friends and results in a more stable system, which consequently reduces the cost of data maintenance. There
are two types of social incentives exploited in this solution: first, users are likely to keep their systems online
when they know they may be of use to their friends, which reduces churn. Second, distinguishing between
permanent failures and transient failures can be done more accurately, with out-of-band social relationships,
which reduces significantly the costs of unnecessary replication. Experimental results show that a F2F
system needs 5.6 times less storage and bandwidth compared to a non-F2F solution for maintaining the
same level of quality of service [121].
Many of the socially aware P2P solutions such as Friendstore [121], FriendBox [123], and F2F [99] were
shown to suffer from several significant limitations. First, users with a small set of friends are penalized by
lack of available services for their needs [99]. Second, friends are typically in close geographical proximity,
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and thus their online times are synchronized, exacerbating the problem of low service availability [124].
Third, as a consequence of the first two issues, the system suffers from overall imbalanced workloads that
lead to low resource utilization.
2.4.2.1 Low Service Availability
In F2F-like systems, service availability (e.g., data availability in storage systems) strongly correlates
to the number of social contacts and the overlap of online time between users and their friends. Due to
geographical colocation, it is possible that a user’s friends are all simultaneously offline when the user
desires to obtain services from friends’ peers [125]. This occurs with high probability especially when users
have few social connections. Thus, generally speaking, F2F systems have lower service availability than
generic systems with random service providers [99]. Redundancy is the default method to improve service
availability. For example, in storage systems, replicas on more than one of the user’s friends’ machines
is the go-to solution, yet it may bring higher costs for unclear benefits. Sharma et al. [125] address this
problem via a greedy data placement heuristic to optimize the trade-off between the number of replicas and
the covered data availability in F2F storage systems. The purpose of the algorithm is to find the minimum
number of friends that can supply maximum coverage. The greedy algorithm defines critical time slot as
that period when only one neighbor is online; and the specific neighbor is called critical neighbor because it
is critical in providing such coverage. To get maximum coverage with minimum number of friends, a node
n first picks all critical neighbors from its friends. If the critical neighbors cannot cover all critical time slots
that node n searches, then it chooses a non-critical friend node that can cover the largest number of time
slots not yet covered. This node-selection process continues until no more nodes are left, or no nodes left
that can cover uncovered time slots. The authors observe that when using a greedy data placement heuristic
in real-world users’ online/offline traces from an instant message server, roughly 50% of nodes have more
than 70% of their time covered with three replicas. For comparison, if data is randomly replicated to friends
or only with critical nodes (with the same replication), then 45% (data placed on friends randomly) and
40% (data placed on critical nodes) of nodes both have 70% coverage. In an extreme scenario, when data
are replicated on all of a node’s friends, 50% of nodes have more than 90% of coverage. But such backup
scheme results in high costs for storing data with multiple replicas, especially for users with many friends.
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Because it treads critical and non-critical nodes equally, the greedy heuristic works well even if the number
of available friends is not large.
Instead of optimizing service placement algorithms, another approach is to expand the resource set
while preserving social incentives. In Chapter 5, we proposed a social strength metric SSn (where n ≥2) to
expand the set of service resources available to node i to neighbors located n hops away in the social graph
who are still socially closer than i’s weakest direct social contact.
2.4.2.2 Imbalanced Workload
In F2F systems, the loads placed on nodes are directly related to their degree, i.e., nodes with high degree
are the ones most often chosen as a storage location while resources from low degree nodes are almost never
requested. The capacity of F2F systems is limited by the resources contributed by its peers, such as band-
width, disk space, or the number of files. However, the available resources are limited and determined by the
number of a peer’s friends. As a result, the distribution of workloads in the entire system is imbalanced—the
majority of workloads are allocated to sociable users while a few move to low-degree users, which results in
low resource utilization and network traffic jams. For example, Friendstore has lower utilization (87%) [121]
compared to storage systems such as DHash [126], Pastry [127] and OpenDHT [128]), which can achieve
perfect utilization. The main reason behind such low resource utilizations is that most unused resources
reside on nodes with few social connections [129]. Therefore, how to balance the workloads between low-
degree and high-degree users while still keeping incentives and trust based on social knowledge is an open
problem.
Because its most intuitive advantage is an increase in the number of resource sharing candidates, the
social strength metric discussed in Chapter 4 is a promising solution for mitigating imbalanced workloads in
F2F systems. Although the candidate set of high-degree users expands more than that of low-degree users,
adequate load allocation protocols could even the workload distribution. One straightforward protocol is
giving high priority to low-degree users to be selected as service providers. In this way, low-degree users are
intentionally involved in more resources sharing activities than without friendsets expansion, which could
transfer some workload from high-degree users.
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CHAPTER 3
DATASETS1
There are six datasets from five domains used in this dissertation. Our datasets vary from fast, non-
profound dynamics to slow professional networks and more traditional social networks augmented with
heavy interactions.
3.1 Team Fortress 2
Team Fortress 2 (TF2) is an objective-oriented first person shooter game released in 2007. We col-
lected more than 10 months of gameplay interactions (from April 1, 2011 to February 3, 2012) on a TF2
server [134]. The dataset includes game-based interactions among players, timestamp information of each
interaction, declared relationship in the associated gaming OSN, Steam Community [18], and the time when
the declared friendship was recorded. The resulting TF2 network is thus composed of edges between players
who had at least one in-game interaction while playing together on this particular server, and also have a
declared friendship in Steam Community. This dataset has several advantages over the Steam declared OSN:
First, it provides the number of in-game interactions that can be used to quantify the strength of a social tie.
Second, it provides players’ online/offline status that we use later in the experiments in Chapter 5. Third,
each interaction and friendship formation is annotated with a timestamp, which is helpful for examining the
dynamics of links under formation. Fourth, over a pure in-game interaction network, it has the advantage
of selecting the most representative social ties, as proven in [134]. In this network of 2.4k nodes and 9.7k
edges, edge weights represent the number of in-game interactions.
1Much of the work in this chapter was first published in [130–133]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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3.2 Infectious Exhibition
Infectious Exhibition (IE) held at the Science Gallery in Dublin, Ireland, from April 17th to July 17th in
2009 was an event where participants explored the mechanisms behind contagion and its containment. Data
were collected via Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) devices that recorded face-to-face proximity rela-
tions of individuals wearing badges [135]. Each interaction was annotated with a timestamp. We translated
the number of interactions into edge weights.
3.3 Co-authorship Networks
Co-authorship networks (CA-I and CA-II) are extracted from ArnetMiner [136] and are based on papers
co-authored by Computer Science researchers [137]. Nodes in these graphs represent authors and edges be-
tween two nodes are weighted with the number of papers co-authored by the two authors. From this dataset
we extracted the two largest connected components (see Table 3.1 for details). Co-authorship I (CA-I) is a
small connected component and a relatively low density. Co-authorship II (CA-II) is the largest connected
component of the ArnetMiner co-authorship network, having a density one order of magnitude higher than
CA-I. Because the dataset does not include time publication information, the observation window is unspec-
ified in Table 3.1.
A brief characterization of the networks appears in Table 3.1. Figure 3.1 plots the degree, edge weight,
and clustering coefficient distributions for each of our networks. We note that IE is a smaller but much
denser network, while TF2’s interactions frequency is much higher than the other networks’, as shown by
the range of edge weights. Even though CA-I and CA-II are extracted from the same OSNs, they have
different degree and clustering coefficient distributions. Since they contain timestamps of the links formed
and interactions between users, we use TF2 and IE networks to validate our proposed social strength metric
by studying link formation in Chapter 4. We use the TF2 and CA networks to study diffusion and peer
expansion in Chapter 5, as they are larger, sparser and based on longer lasting relationships compared to
IE’s ad-hoc interactions.
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Figure 3.1: CDF distributions of degree, weight and clustering coefficient.
3.4 The Higgs-Twitter Dataset
The Higgs dataset includes a 7-day scientific rumor diffsusion process on Twitter in 2012 [138]. The
announcement of the discovery of Higgs boson on Twitter triggered a large-scale information propagation
about this topic. The dataset was collected between 1st and 7th July 2012, including four diffusion periods
(before, during and after the announcement) of the event. Only the messages posted on Twitter about this
discovery containing keywords or hashtags related to the Higgs event are cosidered as spreaded information.
As retweets are highly relevant for the viral propagation of information [139], we use them to capture
the porcess of diffusion. Additionally, our social strength is based on social ties thus followee-follower
(FF) relationships are necessary to estimate the strength of social ties between users. To combine this two
information together, we extracted a followee-follower-retweet (FF-RT) network, which is the intersection
of folloee-follower and retweet networks. We apply our soical strength on the followee-follower-retweet
network to predict information diffusion paths. The statistics of all three networks are shown in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of the social networks used in our experiments. APL: average path length, CC:
clustering coefficient, Assortativity: Ass., EW: range of edge weights, OT: observation time.
Networks Nodes Edges APL Density CC Ass. Diameter EW OT
TF2 2,406 9,720 4.2 0.0034 0.21 0.028 12 [1–21,767] 300 days
IE 410 2,765 3.6 0.0330 0.45 0.225 9 [1–191] 90 days
CA-I 348 595 6.1 0.0098 0.28 0.173 14 [1–52] N/A
CA-II 1,127 6,690 3.4 0.0100 0.33 0.211 11 [1–127] N/A
Table 3.2: The statistics of networks for diffusion paths predictions. ACC: average clustering coefficient
and OT: observation time.
Networks Nodes Edges ACC Diameter OT
Following-Followee (FF) 456,631 14,855,842 0.1887 9 N/A
Retweet (RT) 256,491 328,132 0.0156 19 7 days
Following-Followee-Retweet (FF-RT) 254,872 320,467 0.0155 19 N/A
3.5 Steam and Steam Community
Steam is an online platform developed by Valve [140] that provides a system for players to buy, install,
and play games. It also provides an online social network, Steam Community, where players can create
their profiles, befriend other players, join groups and chat with in-game partners. Each player has a Steam
account but is not required to have a Steam Community profile. A Steam Community profile includes a
nickname, groups the player joined, gameplay status for the past two weeks (achievement, badges, etc.),
friend list, list of games owned, profile setting (private or public), and a cheating flag.
The cheating flag, called a “VAC-ban” after the Valve Anti-Cheat (VAC) service that detects players who
cheat in games and marks their profiles, is permanent and publicly visible regardless of the profile’s privacy
setting. More than 1.5 million Steam accounts have been banned by 2014 [141]. A VAC-ban is associated
with the game in which the player was caught cheating, but that association is not publicly visible. A VAC-
banned player cannot play that game on “VAC-secured” servers, and most game servers are VAC-secured.
The player can, however, play any other games on any appropriate server. The details of how VAC works
are not made public to defend against the prosperous and active cheating industry [142]. What is known,
however, is that VAC bans are not issued immediately upon cheat detection, but in delayed waves. More
detailed information about cheating and anti-cheat in video games can be found in [143].
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3.6 GameMe and Co-Match Network
The contagion of cheating was shown in previous work on the Steam Community [18, 144], but it is
clear that the social network is not the platform that induces cheating. Based on forum discussions [145],
the cheating flag is not seen as a badge of honor. Consequently, seeing it on a friend’s profile is not likely to
inspire a player to cheat. The contagion, we believe, happens during play time, as retaliation when noticing
that an opponent is cheating, or inspired by a teammate’s cheating-enabled performance.
That is why in our work we chose to look at records of in-game interactions. However, this is not
trivial, as gamers play on various servers distributed around the world and owned by different individuals or
groups. Various services connect to these servers and report their status in real time: what game they host,
who are the users engaged in playing, what the score is, etc. We collected playing information from one
such service, GameMe (http://www.gameme.com), whose main purpose is to provide statistics for tracking
players’ in-game performance. These statistics include players’ in-game interactions, such as on which
teams they are playing or with whom they are playing, the global ranking for each game, map performance
overview, etc. For Steam players, the GameMe service connects their GameMe statistics with their Steam
ID, which enables us to connect the two datasets.
3.6.1 Data Collection
For 32 days between March 20, 2015 and April 22, 2015, we recorded co-presence (co-match) informa-
tion every 30 minutes for all 26 games supported by GameMe. Specifically, we collected evidence about
players playing on 1, 283 game servers located in 31 countries, where each server can support multiple
matches simultaneously. As many of these games are built around (typically two) teams playing against
each other, we also collected team information. Our choice of 30-minute periodic crawl was informed by
the observation that most games can be finished within 30 minutes.
Some of the Steam users tracked by GameMe during our observation period did not have Steam profiles
created, which prevented us from gathering more information about them, such as whether their accounts
are VAC-banned. We discarded these players from our dataset. For the Steam Community users recorded by
GameMe during this time we collected additional profile data using the Steam API. The data associated with
each player thus contains a Steam ID, the player’s friend list, a timestamp for each friendship formation, a
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flag (VAC ban) that indicates whether the corresponding user has been detected cheating, and the time when
the cheating flag was applied.
3.6.2 Networks
Using the data we extracted from GameMe and Steam Community, we created two undirected networks,
friendship and co-match. Table 3.3 gives the exact numbers.
1. The friendship network is composed of edges between players who are declared friends on Steam
Community. Each edge has a timestamp to indicate when the relationship was formed.
2. The co-match network is a dynamic network where an edge exists between two players at time t if
they played in the same match. Each edge has a timestamp to indicate when the match happened.
Note that even if we collected all monitored 26 games’ servers, players are not restricted to Steam IDs
when they play games. Players are allowed to use other accounts for play. However, we are only interested in
Steam users, thus we only collected Steam users’ co-presence. These Steam users account for approximately
29.89% of the total players monitored by GameMe. The majority of Steam players reside in four popular
games (Counter-Strike: Global Offensive, Team Fortress 2, Counter-Strike 1.6 and Counter-Strike: Source)
that are notorious for cheating [142,146,147] In these four games, 91.2% of players use their Steam accounts
to play. Thus, the co-match network is able to capture Steam players’ in-game activities without excessive
interference from non-Steam players.
In the co-match network, two players could have no declared friendship at the time of their match.
Additionally, in most scenarios players chose game servers randomly. The servers allocate login allowances
by considering users’ locations, current bandwidth, number of players that are connected to server, etc.,
though some players may reserve the server purposefully. Therefore, during this short time period, most of
the players only co-matched each other for a limited number of times. During our one month observation
time, 91.5% of the pairs of users only co-matched once.
29
Table 3.3: Characteristics of Friendship and Co-Match networks. CoCo: Connected Component, CC: Clus-
tering Coefficient, OT: Observation Time.
Network Nodes Edges # Cheaters Density # CoCo CC OT (days)
Friendship 3,148,289 44,725,277 223,527 (7.1%) 9.0247-06 1,685 0.1809 2,511
Co-Match 167,432 1,130,595 2,359 (1.4%) 8.0661e-05 2,879 0.5498 32
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we described all six datasets that are used in this dissertation. The data’s statistics, dis-
tributions and how we collected them are detailed. These datasets cover a wide range of domains, from
offline (IE) to online social network, from friendship to interaction network, from small to large dataset.
Meanwhile, all datasets are formulated into graphs, with nodes, edges and connection relations. More im-
portantly, besides basic relationships in graph, our datasets are augmented with rich information, providing
good venues to study networks evolutions. Most of our datasets are annotated with time information, e.g.,
friendship formation time in TF2 and Steam networks, interaction time in Co-match TF2 and IE networks
and timezone information of each author in the two co-authorship networks. Interaction frequencies are
also available in IE, CA-I, CA-II, Co-match and TF2 networks, which are annotated as edge weights in
social graphs. The variety and rich information of our data set foundation for our data-driven studies in the
following chapters.
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CHAPTER 4
INDIRECT SOCIAL TIES1
Mining the huge corpus of social data now available in digital format has led to significant advances of
our understanding of social relationships and behavior [148] and confirmed long standing results from soci-
ology on larger datasets. In addition, social information (mainly relating people via declared relationships
on online social networks or via computer-mediated interactions) has been successfully used for a variety of
applications, from spam filtering [97] to recommendations [98] and peer-to-peer backup systems [99].
All these efforts, however, focused mainly on direct ties. Direct social ties (that is, who is directly
connected to whom in the social graph) are natural to observe and reasonably easy to classify as strong or
weak [6, 38]. Indirect social ties, though, defined as a relationship between two individuals who have no
direct relation but are connected through a third person in their social network [149], carry a significantly
larger potential as they facilitate better information dissemination then direct ties [5] and enable significantly
better opportunities [150]. Computer-mediated applications, we conjecture, have a significantly higher po-
tential in mining and exploiting indirect ties, as the direct ties are likely to be used via the traditional channels
through which were used for thousands of years.
However, not all indirect ties are valuable or useful, even at short distances (i.e., 2 hops). For example, a
distant acquaintance of a mere acquaintance is unlikely to have a social incentive for performing a personal
favor, such as sharing available storage on his personal computer. Moreover, trust is likely diluted under
such conditions. Why would a weak distant social contact trust that the data he is asked to store is not illegal
or malicious? In addition, what works for a user or an application might not work for another user or another
application: the indirect tieA−X−B may be strong enough forA to use, but not enough forB to use; or it
may be strong enough to use for a backup application, but not for a social contagion. Therefore, quantifying
the strength of an indirect tie is both necessary and non-trivial.
1Much of the work in this chapter was first published in [132]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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In this work, we build upon and further adapt a metric called social strength, which we introduced
in [151, 152], that quantitatively estimates the strength of an indirect tie. Our metric uses various observa-
tions from sociology and builds on the current opportunities of quantifying the strength of direct ties from
computer or phone-recorded interactions. We rely on the sociology literature to define the requirements of
such a metric (Section 4.1). First, since social relationships are asymmetrically reciprocal [153], the social
strength of an indirect tie consequently needs to be asymmetrical as well. Second, a friend of many of one’s
friends—thus connected via multiple 2-hop paths—can potentially be more socially “close” than the friend
of a friend, connected via only one 2-hop path. Third, the strength of an indirect tie decreases with the length
of the shortest path [14]. In Section 4.2 we validate the social strength metric using real datasets.
4.1 Social Strength Definition
We want to define a metric that quantifies the strength of a social connection between indirectly con-
nected nodes in a social network. The need for such a metric is supported by many sociological studies and
is also intuitively understood from daily life: friends of friends are an important resource for information
and useful social contacts.
In our attempt to quantify an indirect social tie, we use the following observations from sociology and
from recent data-driven studies on computer-mediated social relationships:
• The strength of a direct social relationship is related to the amount of interactions, as shown in [5,
154]: the more frequently persons interact with one another, the more likely they will form strong
relationships. Moreover, interactions among OSN users were shown to represent more meaningful
relations than just declared relationships [13]. Consequently, in the quantification of an indirect social
tie, we rely on a numerical representation of the strength of a direct social tie that can be expressed as
number of interactions, number of shared interests, or other recordable outcomes, depending on the
semantics of the relationship.
• The strength of an indirect tie decreases with the length of the shortest path between the two individ-
uals. This has been quantitatively observed by Friedkin [14], who concluded that people’s awareness
of others’ performance decreases beyond 2 hops. Three degrees of influence theory, proposed by
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Christakis et al. [155] states that social influence does not end with people who are directly connected
but also continues to 2- and 3-hop relationships, albeit with diminishing returns. This theory has held
true in a variety of social networks examined [156, 157]. In accordance with these observations, the
social strength metric we propose focuses on 2- and 3-hop relationships with a decreasing value as a
function of distance.
• Multiple types of social interactions (for example, both professional collaboration and playing tennis
after work) result into a stronger (direct) relationship than only one type of interaction [158]. Further-
more, sociology studies [14] observed that the relationship strength of indirectly connected individuals
greatly depends on the number of different direct or indirect paths connecting them. Therefore, we
consider the strength of multiple shortest paths in our definition of the strength of an indirect social
tie.
• Typically, social ties between individuals are asymmetrically reciprocal [46]. Thus, for the directly
connected users Alice and Bob, the importance of their mutual relationship may be dramatically
different. We want to preserve this asymmetry in quantifying indirect ties, such that Alice and Charlie,
indirectly connected via Bob, are entitled to have different views about their indirect tie.
Therefore, to quantify the social strength of an indirect social tie between users i and m, we consider
relationships at n social hops (n=2 or 3), where n is the shortest path between i and m. We assume a
weighted interaction graph model that connects users with edges weighted based on the intensity of their
direct social interactions. Assuming that Pni,m is the set of different shortest paths of length n joining two
indirectly connected users i and m and N (p) is the set of nodes on the shortest path p, p ∈ Pni,m, we define
the social strength between i and m from i’s perspective over an n-hop shortest path as:
SSn(i,m) = 1−
∏
p∈Pni,m
(1−
min
j,...,k∈N (p)
[NW (i, j), ..., NW (k,m)]
n
) (4.1)
This definition uses the normalized direct social weight NW (i, j) between two directly connected users
i and j, defined as follows:
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NW (i, j) =
∑
∀λ∈Λi,j ω(i, j, λ)∑
∀k∈Ni
∑
∀λ∈Λi,k ω(i, k, λ)
(4.2)
NW (i, j) calculates the strength of a direct relationship by considering all types of interactions λ ∈ Λ
between the users i and j such as phone calls, interactions in online games or number of co-authored papers
(observation O3). These interactions are normalized to the total amount of interactions of type λ that i
has with other individuals. This approach ensures the asymmetry of social weight (observation O4) in two
ways: first, it captures the cases where ω(i, j, λ) 6= ω(j, i, λ) (such as in a phone call graph). Second, by
normalizing to the number of interactions within one’s own social circle, even in undirected social graphs,
the relative weight of the mutual tie will be different from the perspective of each user.
The implementation of observations incorporated O1, O3 and O4 in the definition of the NW function
is naturally carried over in the definition of social strength from SSn(i,m). Moreover, O3 is additionally
implemented by considering the product over all shortest paths p that connect two users. O2 is implemented
by considering the weakest link (minimum normalized weight of all direct ties on each path) and by dividing
it with the distance n between the users.
The proposed social strength measure can:
• Quantify the indirect tie strength for nodes indirectly connected at any social distance.
• Treat indirect ties between two nodes as possibly asymmetric in strength rather than constraining the
values to be equal.
• Be more sensitive to strength differences because it uses both edge weights and number of paths to
calculate a value.
• Be calculated without graph’s global information.
4.2 Social Strength Evaluation
In sociology, the theory of homophily [32] postulates that people tend to form ties with others who have
similar characteristics. Moreover, a stronger relationship implies greater similarity [5]. Therefore, a number
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of link prediction models that estimate tie strength from graph structure [159] or interaction frequency and
users’ declared profiles similarities [160] have been proposed.
To verify that social strength is in fact quantifying the strength of social ties, we frame it as a link
prediction problem. Simply put, given a pair of users, the link prediction problem asks whether the strength
of the tie is strong enough to form a social relationship between them. Specifically, given a snapshot of a
social network, we use social strength values to infer which new relationships or interactions among users
are likely to occur in the near future. Granovetter put forth the idea of the “forbidden triad” [5], i.e., a triad
where there is a strong tie between say u and v as well as a strong tie between v and w, but no tie between
u and w is extremely unlikely to exist. Under the theory of triadic closure, forbidden triads will quickly
close because a relationship will form between u and w. Thus, if we can effectively predict edge formations
based on the value of social strength, the implication is that social strength is capturing the strength of ties
between distant nodes. We compare our results with three other metrics used for link prediction.
4.2.1 Compared Metrics
We compare three well-established link prediction metrics with the social strength metric to demonstrate
how effective is in link prediction. A number of approaches are based on the idea that if two nodes i and
j have large overlap in their neighbors, they have higher likelihood to form a link in the future. In the
following definition, let Γ(i) denote the set of node i’s neighbors.
Jaccard coefficient (J) is a commonly used similarity metric that was proposed by Salton and McGill [41]:
J(i, j) =
|Γ(i) ∩ Γ(j)|
|Γ(i) ∪ Γ(j)|
Adamic-Adar (AA) is a metric that only counts common features by inverting log frequency of their occur-
rence [42]:
AA(i, j) =
∑
z∈Γ(i)∩Γ(j)
1
log|Γ(z)|
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Katz defined a metric that sums all possible paths between two nodes [45]:
Katz(i, j) =
∞∑
l=1
βl · |P li,j |
P li,j is the set of all length − l paths between i and j. Paths are exponentially damped by length, so that
shorter paths count more heavily. β (β > 0) is a parameter that if set at a very small number, the mea-
surement is similar to the common neighbors metric that directly counts the common friends between two
nodes, since more than 2-hop path lengths contribute little to the summation. According to the experimental
results in [161] (Figure 3), β = 0.0005 gives better prediction performance than other values. Thus, in
the following experiments we set the parameter β to 0.0005. Note that even if a weighted Katz metric is
discussed in [161], it is only applicable to 1-hop social distance that is not suitable to our problem (2- and
3-hop distance), thus, in this paper, we only conduct comparisons with unweighted Katz metric as described
below.
All these metrics give a score that quantifies the strength of the social tie between two nodes. Jaccard
and Adamic-Adar are based on node neighborhoods while Katz uses the ensemble of all paths between two
nodes. Therefore, Jaccard and Adamic-Adar restrict their measurements to nodes that are 2-hops away while
Katz can be applied to n-hop (n ≥ 1) social distance, which is comparable to our social strength metric on
longer path lengths.
4.2.2 Experiments
As we explained in Section 4.1, people can be aware of others’ behaviors within 2 hops and be influenced
by indirect ties up to 3 hops. Thus, we focus our experiments on 2- and 3-hop social distance.
4.2.2.1 Experimental Setup
We formalize the link prediction task as a binary classification problem that predicts whether an edge
exists in the graph or not, when two users are 2- or 3-hops away from each other. First, for all pairs of
users u and v, we label them with the timestamp of their relationship (tuv), or ∅ in the case that there was
no relationship by the end of our observation period. Next, we compute the 2- and 3-hop social strength
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between each u, v pair based on the state of the graph at time tuv − 1, or in the case of ∅, the final state of
the graph.
For example, subfigure (a) in Figure 4.1 indicates the state of the subgraph of nodes A, B, and C at the
end of the observation period. When given the pair B, C, whose relationship formed at t3, the calculation of
their social strength includes the edges AB and AC since they both formed prior to t3. Conversely, when
given the pair A, B, none of the edges are included in the social strength calculation. A similar scenario of
a 3-hop prediction is depicted in subfigure (c) in Figure 4.1.
The TF2 network has a timestamp of when a declared relationship was created, but the IE network only
has the timestamp of the first recorded face-to-face interaction between two individuals. Thus, for IE, we
use this timestamp as a proxy for the creation of a relationship.
For 2-hop social distance, there are 5, 984 pairs in TF2 with tuv 6= ∅, i.e., that had a relationship form
prior to the end of the observation period, and 161, 561 pairs with tuv = ∅; 2, 475 with tuv 6= ∅ and 676, 863
with tuv = ∅ for 3-hop distant users. IE has 1, 886 formed relations and 4, 111 unformed for 2 hops, and
484 formed relations and 24, 631 unformed for 3 hops. In other words, our datasets are imbalanced with
respect to formed relationships and no relationships (∅). There are two common approaches for dealing
with imbalanced data classifications: under-sampling [162] and over-sampling [163]. We chose to under-
sample users with no relationships, thus in our experiment they appear at the same empirical frequency as
the formed relationships.
4.2.2.2 Results
In our prediction tasks, we use a classic tree-structured machine learning classifier, Decision Tree (J48),
and the scores calculated from evaluation metrics as features. Note that because we treat social relationships
asymmetrically, social strength outputs two different scores, each coming from the node’s own perspec-
tive. We compare the performance of our social strength to the three tie strength metrics introduced in
Section 4.2.1. Four evaluators—Precision, Recall, F-Measure and Area Under Curve (AUC)—are used to
evaluate the prediction performance. Table 4.1 shows the link prediction results of nodes 2 hops away. We
run 10-fold cross validation [164]. Among all evaluations and classifiers, social strength outperforms other
metrics in predicting link existence between pairs of users. We note that the AUC arrives up to 0.765 for the
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TF2 network and reaches 0.872 for the IE network when using social strength, greatly outperforming the
other predictor metrics.
Next, we test social strength’s viability at predicting link existence from 3-hops away as people are
influenced by others within 3-hop social distance [155]. However, both Jaccard and Adamic-Adar metrics
are restricted to predictions within 2 hops, thus, only social strength and Katz results appear in Table 4.1. We
note that while social strength’s effectiveness is reduced, it still manages to properly discriminate between
existing and non-existing links up to ∼64.5% of the time in TF2 and 67.1% of the time in IE. While it is
expected to see a decrease in performance when we cross the horizon of observability of 2 hops [14], our
results show that social strength preserves a quantification of the strength of indirect social ties.
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Figure 4.1: Demonstration of a pair of nodes’ relationship status. (a) a pair of nodes, B and C, have a
relationship in 2-hop social distance before t3, where t1 < t3 and t2 < t3, and they formed a direct relation
at t3. (b) a pair of nodes, B and C, have a relationship in 2-hop social distance and no direct relation formed
(∅) by the end of our observation period. (c) a pair of nodes, C and D, have a relationship in 3-hop social
distance before t4, where t1 < t4, t2 < t4, and t3 < t4, and they formed a direct relation at t4. (d) a pair of
nodes, C and D, have a relationship in 3-hop social distance and no direct relation formed (∅) by the end of
our observation period.
4.2.3 Relevant Information for Measuring Indirect Ties
As Table 4.1 shows, the social strength metric SS outperforms the other three metrics in both 2- and
3-hop social distance. Two ways in which SS differs from the other three metrics is that it considers the
following attributes that the other metrics do not:
• SS considers the strength of direct ties, that is, the weights on the edges. More importantly, SS
includes edge weight even in a longer social distance that is seldom taken into account by other
metrics.
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Table 4.1: Results of link prediction between pairs of n-hop distant users. Adamic-Adar: AA, Jaccard: J,
Social Strength: SS. Only the SS and Katz metrics are applicable to n = 3.
Classifier n Network Metric Precision Recall F-Measure AUC
Decision Tree 2
TF2
SS 0.746±0.01 0.741±0.08 0.744±0.06 0.765±0.09
AA 0.714±0.02 0.708±0.03 0.710±0.04 0.712±0.08
J 0.511±0.01 0.514±0.06 0.502±0.07 0.510±0.08
Katz 0.697±0.01 0.692±0.01 0.691±0.02 0.684±0.05
IE
SS 0.843±0.01 0.840±0.02 0.837±0.02 0.872±0.01
AA 0.697±0.01 0.693±0.02 0.692±0.06 0.695±0.04
J 0.698±0.01 0.687±0.04 0.682±0.04 0.690±0.07
Katz 0.663±0.03 0.660±0.02 0.659±0.02 0.659±0.01
Decision Tree 3
TF2
SS 0.630±0.02 0.627±0.01 0.624±0.01 0.644±0.03
Katz 0.518±0.07 0.621±0.05 0.542±0.03 0.537±0.03
IE
SS 0.659±0.01 0.650±0.01 0.646±0.01 0.664±0.01
Katz 0.628±0.05 0.609±0.06 0.601±0.06 0.623±0.07
• SS considers that relationships are inherently asymmetric. Specifically, SS uses in its calculation the
fact that for a direct tie A-B, where A has degree dA and B degree dB , with dB << dA, A is more
important to B than B may be for A. This asymmetry translates easily to larger distances as well.
Next we investigate empirically how each of these two attributes affects the accuracy in quantifying the
indirect tie strength between two nodes.
4.2.3.1 Experiments
To isolate the effects of edge weights and asymmetry, we introduce two modifications to the social
strength metric SS in the following ways:
• We consider an unweighted social graph for the definition of SS in Eq. 4.1. Consequently, all edge
weights are set to 1. We refer to this modified, unweighted social strength measure as UWSS.
• We consider a further modification of USS in which the asymmetry is removed. Note that asymmetry
in the definition of the social strength metric is caused by normalization, that is, a user’s interactions
are normalized to the total number of interactions that the user has with other individuals (Eq. 4.2).
To isolate the effect of asymmetry, we define the metric SymSS based on SS, in which NW = 1.
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We repeat the previous experiments with the simplified metrics UWSS and SymSS using the same ex-
perimental setup as described earlier in Section 4.2.2.1. However, instead of SS, we use the scores calculated
from UWSS and SymSS as features in the prediction task.
4.2.3.2 Results
The results shown in Table 4.2 allow us to make the following two observations. First, compared to the
prediction results of SS in Table 4.1, the prediction performance of unweighted social strength’s (UWSS)
declines throughout both datasets and in both 2- and 3-hop social distance, and the reduction in perfor-
mance reaches 20.4% (2 hops link prediction of IE). This fact confirms that edge weight, as a good social
relationship proxy, is useful for evaluating social ties more accurately.
Second, for both datasets and social distances, predictions based on asymmetric social relationships
(UWSS) achieve better performance than SymSS that simply treats social relationships equally. Conse-
quently, using local graph topology information, as captured in UWSS, improves the estimation of indirect
tie strength.
Table 4.2: Results of link prediction between pairs of n-hop distant users. Symmetric Social Strength:
SymSS, Unweighted Social Strength: UWSS. Results of SS are copied from Table 4.1 for comparison
convenience.
Classifier n Network Metric Precision Recall F-Measure AUC
Decision Tree 2
TF2
SS 0.746±0.01 0.741±0.08 0.744±0.06 0.765±0.09
UWSS 0.703±0.04 0.702±0.04 0.702±0.05 0.739±0.06
SymSS 0.687±0.02 0.681±0.03 0.679±0.04 0.676±0.08
IE
SS 0.843±0.01 0.840±0.02 0.837±0.02 0.872±0.01
UWSS 0.686±0.01 0.681±0.06 0.678±0.04 0.703±0.01
SymSS 0.666±0.01 0.664±0.02 0.664±0.06 0.668±0.04
Decision Tree 3
TF2
SS 0.630±0.02 0.627±0.01 0.624±0.01 0.644±0.03
UWSS 0.638±0.03 0.611±0.03 0.561±0.04 0.625±0.03
SymSS 0.609±0.05 0.580±0.05 0.550±0.08 0.585±0.06
IE
SS 0.659±0.01 0.650±0.01 0.646±0.01 0.664±0.01
UWSS 0.671±0.01 0.650±0.03 0.638±0.04 0.641±0.04
SymSS 0.640±0.05 0.634±0.06 0.634±0.06 0.637±0.07
To conclude, compared to the social strength metric (SS) that uses the edge weights and in an asymmet-
rical, normalized way, the decreased performance of the unweighted version (UWSS) and the symmetrical
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version (SymSS) verifies that edge weights and asymmetry should be considered in a tie strength measure-
ment. These are the very merits of our social strength metric and they lead to increased accuracy of link
prediction.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a social strength metric to measure the strength of indirect social ties
by considering both the intensity of interactions and the number of connected paths. We showed that our
metric is effective in predicting links formation (can achieve 0.881 prediction accuracy), indicating that it is
an accurate quantification of the intensity of a(n indirect) social relationship.
A variety of socially aware applications can benefit from the social strength metric. For example, link
prediction based on social strength could discover more potentially useful contacts and improve link recom-
mendation accuracy. Automatically setting default privacy controls based on social strength is likely to be
more accurate than using graph distance alone. Employing social strength in graph partitioning will have
the benefits of relying on local computation, thus allowing for more decentralized and scalable algorithms.
Finally, in decentralized OSNs, users’ augmented social strength-based friendsets could provide a more
efficient and privacy-guaranteed technique to propagate updates in the presence of churn.
This work is a first step in understanding the value of and the methodology for quantifying the strength
of indirect social ties. In addition to exploring the applicability space, there are aspects related to privacy and
security that need to be understood. Intuitively, because of the local exploration of one’s social neighborhood
for computing social strength, the risks are contained, especially compared to approaches that require the
global graph. However, a formal study of this topic is required for building a practical framework that
enables the implementation and adoption of the social strength metric for indirect ties.
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CHAPTER 5
THE INFLUENCE OF INDIRECT TIES ON SOCIAL NETWORK DYNAMICS1
While direct social ties have been intensely studied in the context of computer-mediated social networks,
indirect ties (e.g., friends of friends) have seen less attention. Yet in real life, we often rely on friends of our
friends for recommendations (of doctors, schools, or babysitters), for introduction to a new job opportunity,
and for many other occasional needs. In this chapter, we empirically study the predictive power of indirect
ties in two dynamic processes in social networks: new link formation and information diffusion. We not only
verify the predictive power of indirect ties in new link formation but also show that this power is effective
over longer social distance. Moreover, we show that the strength of an indirect tie positively correlates to the
speed of forming a new link between the two end users of the indirect tie. Finally, we show that the strength
of indirect ties can serve as a predictor for diffusion paths in social networks.
We analyzed the quantifiable effects that indirect ties have on network dynamics and make several con-
tributions. First, in Section 5.1 we classify an indirect tie as weak or strong, showing that the classification
meets theoretical expectations of a positive correlation between the strength of a tie and the speed at which a
link forms. We also show in Section 5.2 that pairs with a strong indirect tie end up having more interactions
after link formation when compared to pairs with a weak indirect tie. Finally, in Section 5.3 we examine
indirect tie strength as a predictor for diffusion paths in a network. Our findings from this empirical study
invite a more in-depth investigation of the potential of indirect ties for a variety of social phenomena and
computer applications. Our main contributions can be summarized as:
• We quantitively confirm/study several well-understood sociological phenomena—such as the timing
of tie formation and how the triadic closure affects information diffusion processes—with online
social networks (OSNs).
1Much of the work in this chapter was first published in [132]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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Figure 5.1: Demonstration of nodes relationships. (a) B and C have a 2-hop relationship before t3, since
t1, t2 < t3, and a 1-hop relationship thereafter. (b) C and D have a 3-hop relationship before t4, since
t1, t2, t3 < t4, and a 1-hop relationship thereafter.
• Compared to most of previous studies, we extend the study of the impact of indirect ties between users
to distance longer than 2 hops.
• We experimentally show that indirect ties have predictive power of information diffusion paths.
5.1 Timing of Link Formation
Network dynamics can also be examined from the perspective of link delays [165]. If we say that a link
between two nodes is possible when all the enabling conditions are met, then the link delay is the time lag
between the conditions being met and the link forming. In this section, we investigate two aspects of timing
of link formation: (1) if there is a connection between the strength of a tie of indirectly connected users and
the delay the link experiences before it is formed; (2) whether there is a connection between the “speed” of
the formation of a tie of indirectly connected users and the delay the link experiences before it is formed.
5.1.1 Methodology
Let us consider the toy networks in Figure 5.1. We define the link formation delay for 2-hop indirect ties
((a) in Figure 5.1) as:
∆(b,c) = t(b,c) −max{t(a,b), t(a,c)},
where t(a,b) is the time when the direct link between two nodes is established. This formulation can also
be thought of as the triadic closure delay [165]. ∆ thus is a proxy of the “speed” at which two indirectly
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connected nodes become directly connected: small ∆ indicates that the triangle closes quickly, and vice
versa.
Similarly, the link formation delay for 3-hop indirect ties ((b) in Figure 5.1) is:
∆(c,d) = t(c,d) −max{t(a,b), t(a,d), t(b,c)}.
Although no direct analogue for the 3-hop link formation delay was explored in [165], an n-hop link delay
can be considered a form of the general link delay scenario with the restriction that an n-hop shortest path
must exist between the two nodes under consideration.
In the first case, to measure the strength of indirect ties, we employ the social strength metric to quantify
the strength of a social connection between indirectly connected nodes. We are primarily interested in
whether the latent tie strength between indirectly connected nodes corresponds to different delays in a direct
connection forming. Intuitively, if the strength of a user’s indirect tie is stronger than any of the user’s strong
direct ties, we consider it a strong indirect tie. Because we have no information regarding the strength of a
direct tie (other than the edge weight), we consider an indirect tie of a’s as strong if its strength is larger than
the minimum/average/maximum weight of all of a’s direct edges. This is formally presented below. (We
note that the social strength metric is asymmetric, i.e., SS(a, b) 6= SS(b, a)):
• SS(a, b) ≥ min
i∈Neigh(a)
[NW (a, i)] or SS(b, a) ≥ min
a∈Neigh(i)
[NW (i, a)] (i.e., minimum value 1-hop
edge weight)
• SS(a, b) ≥
∑
i∈Neigh(a)
[NW (a,i)]
size(Neigh(a)) or SS(b, a) ≥
∑
a∈Neigh(i)
[NW (i,a)]
size(Neigh(i)) (i.e., mean value of 1-hop edge
weight)
• SS(a, b) ≥ max
i∈Neigh(a)
[NW (a, i)] or SS(b, a) ≥ max
a∈Neigh(i)
[NW (i, a)] (i.e., maximum value of 1-
hop edge weight)
In each criteria, NW (a, b) is the normalized weight of the edge between nodes a and b, and the normal-
ization is conducted by the total weight of node a’s edges. If an indirect tie (a, b) satisfies the conditions
for a given criteria, it is marked as a strong indirect tie otherwise it is marked as a weak indirect tie. We
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Table 5.1: Statistics of strong and weak ties. The statistics of 2- and 3-hop indirect ties in TF2 and IE
networks where ties are divided into strong and weak ties under three criteria.
Dist. Network Tie strength classification criterion # strong ties # weak ties
2 TF2 ≥minimum value of 1-hop edge weight 6,868 164
2 TF2 ≥mean value of 1-hop edge weight 5,470 1,562
2 TF2 ≥maximum value of 1-hop weight 2,780 4,252
3 TF2 ≥minimum value of 1-hop edge weight 2,351 90
3 TF2 ≥mean value of 1-hop edge weight 297 2,144
3 TF2 ≥maximum value of 1-hop edge weight 12 2,429
2 IE ≥minimum value of 1-hop edge weight 1,555 42
2 IE ≥mean value of 1-hop edge weight 1,235 344
2 IE ≥maximum value of 1-hop weight 715 882
3 IE ≥minimum value of 1-hop edge weight 193 258
3 IE ≥mean value of 1-hop edge weight 11 440
3 IE ≥maximum value of 1-hop edge weight 0 451
note that those ties satisfying condition (3) have the strongest tie strength than the other two cases. Table 5.1
summarizes the tie classification results when these criteria are applied to the networks TF2 and IE.
In the second case, n path means a shortest path between two indirectly connected nodes A and B is n,
and the n-path formation delay means the time delay between the first edge of n path and the last edge that
consists n-length path, if we sort edges by their formation time. Here, we want to emphasize that because of
the possibility of multiple influential n paths between two nodes (examples in Figure 5.3), the last formed
edge is not any one edge that composes n-length path but the one (e.g., edgeBD in (a) of Figure 5.3) finally
triggers the closing of a loop. We follow the previous strategy, narrowing our discussion to 2- and 3-path
formation delay. First, we define the 2-path formation delay as:
Θ(b,c) = max{t(a,b), ..., t(a,c)} −min{t(a,b), ..., t(a,c)},
where t(a,b) is the time when the direct link between two nodes is established. Θ is a proxy of the “speed” at
which two unconnected or indirectly connected nodes have a 2-length shortest path: small Θ indicates that
the 2-path forms quickly, and vice versa. Likewise, the 3-path formation delay ((b) in Figure 5.3) is:
Θ(b,a) = max{t(b,c), ..., t(d,a)} −min{t(b,c), ..., t(d,a)},
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5.1.2 Experimental Results
We use the TF2 and IE networks described in Chapter 3 to analyze link delays when examining 2- and
3-hop indirect ties. We compare the link delay of weak and strong ties classified by the previously defined
criteria. For TF2, we use days as the time window, but for IE we use minutes due to the ephemeral nature of
its face-to-face interactions.
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Figure 5.2: Link delays comparison of strong and weak ties in TF2 and IE. Note that for IE network, when
3-hop ties are divided by maximum value of 1-hop edge weight, no strong ties exist.
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Figure 5.3: Examples of multiple 2(3)-relations between a pair of nodes. These nodes finally close the
triangle or square.
For the first case, the link delay distributions are plotted in Figure 5.2, where we see that pairs with strong
indirect ties formed direct links with less delay than those with weak indirect ties. We note that strong ties
formed their link with less delay than weak ties throughout all scenarios and when the tie is stronger, its link
formed even quicker. For example, when using 3-hop indirect ties in TF2 and criteria (3) for classifying
strong vs. weak, 33% of strong indirect ties formed a direct link within a day, compared to only 7% for
weak indirect ties. In contrast, over 40% of weak indirect ties formed direct links with a very large delay
(over 60 days).
Overall, these results indicate several things. First, the difference between weak and strong indirect ties
has a direct impact on how long it takes for a direct tie to form. Second, when indirect ties is stronger, there
is an increased chance for them to establish a link quicker. Third, even quantifying the strength of the tie
from 3-hops away, strong indirect ties led to faster link creation.
For the second case, the relationship between link delay and 2- and 3-path formation delay are plotted
in Figure 5.4. Clearly, in the friendship-based TF2 network, the link delay presents almost a linear increase
when n-path formation delay enlarges. That is, in a triad relation, if any two pair of individuals established
relationships within a short time, it is much quicker for the third pair of people to know each other. In an
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Figure 5.4: Delays in TF2 and IE. The relationship of paths formation delay and closing edge delay in TF2
and IE. The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval.
extreme scenario, if two edges in the triad are created simultaneously (no time lost), the third edge closes
the triangle immediately. This trend continues in the interaction-based IE network. Another interesting
phenomenon is that under the same condition, 2-path link delays are much smaller than 3 hops’, about
54.5% smaller when the path formation delay is less than 100 days in the friendship network of TF2. Such
difference is further amplified as the value of path formation delay increases. Even if this is not always true
in the interaction network of IE, overall 2-hop relationships bring quicker closing edge formation than 3
hops. Thus, longer social distance is also a factor of link formation delay.
5.2 Interaction Intensity along Newly Formed Links
A key characteristic of social interactions is their continual change, and this change is likely to affect
user behavior related to network dynamics. E.g., frequent interactions lead to the formation of new links,
and by interacting with each other, information can be disseminated in the network. Thus, we believe the
interactions of indirect ties changes also can infer the dynamic status of the network. Note that among all
four datasets introduced in Chapter 3, only the online game social network (TF2) supplies a timestamp for
each friendship formation and interaction. Thus in the following analysis our main analysis is based on TF2
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Figure 5.5: Interaction intensity comparison in TF2. Interaction intensity before vs. after 2- and 3-hop link
formation in TF2, and strong vs. weak ties’ interaction intensity after link formation of TF2
network. In this section, we analyze the differences of interaction intensity before and after link formation
among indirect ties from the following perspective.
We analyze the intensity of user’s interactions before and after their link formation on 2- and 3-hop
social distance. Figure 5.5 compares the distribution of indirect ties’ interaction intensity before and after
the indirect ties form their links. We can see that in both scenarios (2 and 3 hops), more pairs of users
have interactions after their link formation than before the link formation. For example, 54% pair of users
have no interactions before they establish an edge with each other while this number decreases to 17% after
2-hop indirect ties form their edges. This result clearly shows that after indirect ties forming their link, their
interactions not only continue but also increase, which means users do spend efforts to maintain their newly
formed relationships that came about via indirect relations.
As a further step, we investigate the difference of interaction intensity between strong and weak indirect
ties after forming their links. We use criterium 1 in Section 5.1 to classify indirect ties into strong and weak
ties and plot their interaction intensity after forming their links in Figure 5.5. Clearly, we can see that strong
ties maintain their relationship with more interactions than weak ties.
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5.3 Indirect Ties Predict Information Diffusion Paths
The diffusion of information is a fundamental process in social networks and has been extensively stud-
ied in the past (e.g., [166–169]). In fact, some studies have shown that the evolution of a network is affected
by the diffusion of information in the network [168] and vice versa [167]. Our results from the previous
sections showed that indirect ties affect the process of network evolution. The stronger an indirect tie is, i.e.,
due to higher interactions between the intermediate nodes, the quicker a link is formed. In this section we go
a step further and investigate if the strength of indirect ties can predict diffusion paths between distant nodes
in the graph. That is, departing from the step-wise diffusion processes examined in the past, and given that a
user received a piece of information at time t, can we predict which other users will receive this information
at t+ n (n ≥ 2)? I.e., if we know someone who received the information at t0, then we can directly predict
the infected users at tn (n ≥ 2) instead of step-wise, e.g., at t1.
Predictions over such longer intervals could help OSN providers customize strategies for preventing or
accelerating information spreading. For example, to contain rumors, OSN providers could block related
messages sent to the susceptible users several time steps before the rumor arrives, or disseminate official
anti-rumor messages in advance. Similarly, advertisers could accelerate their advertisements spreading in
the network by discovering who will be the next susceptible to infection. This n-hop long paths prediction
can supply more time for decision makers to contain harmful disseminations, and to choose users who are
pivotal in information spreading for targeted advertisements.
This section describes our experiments of applying several indirect-tie measurements (metrics) to predict
information diffusion paths. As real-world diffuion traces of Twitter information diffusion lack interaction
information that can better utilize our social strength for diffusion paths prediction, we used both simulation
and a real-world dataset to demonstrate the power of indirect ties for information propagation.
5.3.1 Simulation
The strength of an indirect tie decreases with the length of the shortest path between the two individuals.
This has been quantitatively observed by Friedkin [14], who concluded that people’s awareness of others’
performance decreases beyond 2 hops. Three degrees of influence theory, proposed by Christakis et al. [155]
states that social influence does not end with people who are directly connected but also continues to 2- and
50
3-hop relationships, albeit with diminishing returns. This theory has held true in a variety of social networks
examined [156, 157]. In accordance with these observations, we set our experiments up to 3 hops. A single
node is chosen as the original source of information at t0. We then predict the nodes that will accept the
information at tn with the knowledge from t0.
As ground truth, we applied the basic and widely-studied Linear Threshold (LT) diffusion model [170]
to simulate a diffusion process and record the diffusion paths, i.e., which nodes are affected during each
time step. The LT model is a threshold-based diffusion model where nodes can be in one of two states:
active or inactive. We say a node has accepted the information if it is active and once it becomes active,
it can never return to the inactive state. In the LT model, a node v is influenced by each of its neighbors
Neighv according to an edge weight bv,w. Each node v chooses a threshold θv that is randomly generated
from the interval [0,1]. The diffusion process is simulated as follows. First, an initial set of active nodes
A0 are chosen at random; these are the seed nodes. Then, at each step t, all nodes that were active in step
t− 1 remain active, and we activate any node v for which the total weight of its active neighbors is at least
θv, that is
∑
w∈Neighv bv,w ≥ θv. Thus, the threshold θv intuitively represents the different latent tendencies
of nodes to adopt the behavior exhibited by neighbors, and a node’s tendency to become active increases as
more of its neighbors become active. The input to the simulation is a weighted graph where edge weights
represents the intensity of interactions between nodes. Note that the LT model considers only the status of a
node’s directly connected neighbors.
We controlled the effectiveness of the diffusion by changing the upper bound of the thresholds applied on
the nodes gradually to simulate different diffusion processes, from almost no diffusion to fully dissemination
to all nodes in the graph. To do so, we set a threshold θv = random(0, 1)/w, wherew is empirically selected
based on the range of edge weights in each of the tested networks, i.e., w in the range of [1-10] for the CA-I,
[1-30] for the CA-II and [1-60] for the TF2.
Once we generate the ground truth from the LM model, we then use the strength of indirect tie to predict
the path of diffusion. To measure the strength of indirect ties, we also employ social strength, Adamic-Adar
and Jaccard metrics introduced in Chapter 4 where social strength metric considers the edge weight while
Adamic-Adar and Jaccard only consider the neighborhood overlap. We calculate the strength of indirect tie
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values between the seed and its n-hop friends, then convert the values to a social rank. Each user has a rank
list for all her friends according to the indirect tie value between said user and the friend.
After obtaining social ranks, we need a cut-off threshold to decide whether or not a node’s n-hop friends
will be infected at tn+2. The strategy we adopt here is that the social ranks from information recipient’s
perspective must be high, e.g., socialrankn(A,B) ranks among the top 10% of user A’s friends. Then, the
cut-off threshold can classify a node’s n-hop friends into two categories: active or inactive at tn+2. That is,
θpred = len(Neighnhops)/q, and q is empirically selected to have an inversely proportional relationship to
w which decides the diffusion process from almost no diffusion to fully disseminate to all nodes. In other
words, when no diffusion happens the θpred should be small enough to select the most strongest indirect ties
while in fully diffused scenario a larger θpred is needed to cover a large portion of indirect ties. The intuition
of this cut-off is that users will likely believe the information from their “closest” social ties.
We compare the prediction results with the ground truth obtained from the diffusion simulation to verify
the effectiveness of the social strength in predicting diffusion paths. We evaluate our method using accuracy,
sensitivity and specificity [171].
In literature, co-authorship networks capture many general features of social networks [40] and have
been studied in information cascades [170], and diffusion dynamics have been observed in online game
social networks [83, 172]. Therefore, in our experiments, we use the three datasets—CA-I, CA-II and
TF2—as described in the previous section.
Figure 5.6 and 5.7 depict the prediction results in 2- and 3-hop social distance, respectively. We see
that for both 2- and 3-hop paths predictions, overall the accuracies of indirect tie metrics are higher than
the baseline’s, reaching a maximum of 0.94 with Social Strength metric in 2-hop paths prediction. Also,
the accuracies of the three indirect-tie metrics in all cases are always higher than 0.56, and Social Strength
outperforms the other two metrics in most of the scenarios. Although 3-hop predictions (generated by the
Social Strength metric) show decreased sensitivity, specificity, and accuracy compared to 2-hop results, they
remain above 0.64. It is important to note that these three networks have very different network structure
(from sparse to dense), yet the performance of indirect tie metrics are consistently higher than the baseline
in all three networks and for different diffusion thresholds. From these results, we conclude that indirect ties
can be used in the prediction of information diffusion, i.e., along which paths information will propagate
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and which users will be activated, at least 2-3 steps before a susceptible node is even in contact with an
infected node.
5.3.2 Real-World Diffusion Process of Twitter
The strength of an indirect tie decreases with the length of the shortest path between the two individuals
and people can be influenced up to 3 hops. Thus, we set our experiments up to 3 hops. A single node is
chosen as the original source of information at t0. We then predict the nodes that will accept the information
at tn (n = 2 or 3) with the knowledge from t0.
In information diffusion, users are classified into three categories: seeds, information spreaders and non-
spreaders. Thus, we divided all users in the Higgs-Twitter dataset into seeds who are the source of diffusion
and never retweeted other users’ messages during the diffusion process; information spreaders are users
who retweeted other users’ messages after exposure to them; non-spreaders are users who exposed to the
information but did not retweet messages.
As ground truth, we extracted 2-hop and 3-hop diffusion paths from the Higgis dataset, i.e., each directed
2(3)-hop diffusion path begins from a seed and ends with a spreader. Note that on the diffusion paths all
users are spreaders. We also extracted 2-hop and 3-hop non-diffusion paths, which begin from seeds but end
with non-spreaders and not all users on the path are spreaders.
Once we extracted the ground truth from the Higgs-Twitter dataset, we then use social strength to predict
the path of diffusion. We calculate social strength values between seed and its n-hop nodes, then use the
value as a feature for binary classification. Our main experimental steps are summarized as follows:
• Step 1: Seeds Selection. Users are selected as seeds if they are the first to tweet messages on Higgis
topic during the observation time.
• Step 2: Ground Truth Extraction. As the paths prediction is a binary classification (with or without
diffusion), both diffusion and non-diffusion paths need to be extracted.
• Step 3: Social Strength Calculation. Calculating the social strength value between each seed and its
2(3)-hop directed followers.
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• Step 4: Paths Prediction. Social strength values are used as a feature to classify all paths into diffusion
and non-diffusion paths.
In the Higgs-Twitter dataset, 22, 262 users are seeds, and 204, 709, 636 are 2-hop non-diffusion paths
while only 10, 619 are diffusion paths. For 3-hop paths, 290, 553, 709 are non-diffusion paths and 215, 445
are diffusion paths. For this imbalanced data, we under sample non-diffusion paths to make both types of
paths appear at at the same frequency.
In literature, co-authorship networks capture many general features of social networks [40] and have
been studied in information cascades [170], and diffusion dynamics have been observed in online game
social networks [83, 172]. Therefore, in our experiments, we use the three datasets—CA-I, CA-II and
TF2—as described in the previous section. To better demonstrate the social strength’s effective power on
inferring diffusion processes, we compare indirect tie metrics with a baseline method, which randomly
selects a information recipient’s 2 and 3-hop friends to accept the information.
In literature, co-authorship networks capture many general features of social networks [40] and have
been studied in information cascades [170], and diffusion dynamics have been observed in online game
social networks [83, 172]. Therefore, in our experiments, we use the three datasets—CA-I, CA-II and
TF2—as described in the previous section. To better demonstrate the social strength’s effective power on
inferring diffusion processes, we compare indirect tie metrics with a baseline method, which randomly
selects a information recipient’s 2 and 3-hop friends to accept the information.
We compare the prediction results with the ground truth obtained from the Higgs event diffusion process
to verify the effectiveness of the social strength in predicting diffusion paths. We evaluate our method using
accuracy, sensitivity and specificity [171]. To better demonstrate social strength’s effective power on infer-
ring diffusion processes, we compare the social strength prediction performance with three other metrics
(Jaccard Coefficient, Adamic-Adar and Katz) introduced in Section 4.2.1. Note that in the Higgs-Twitter
dataset, users’ retweet behavior happened during the diffusion process, and users’ interaction information
before diffusion is not available, which means all graphs are unweighted graphs. Thus, we use the un-
weighted social strength (UWSS) metric introduced in Section 4.2.3 instead of the weighted one. If edge
weights are available in real diffusion traces, it is possible for social strength to reach even higher predic-
tion accuracy. Table 5.2 presents the prediction results in a 2- and 3-hop social distance, respectively. As
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both Jaccard Coefficient and Adamic-Adar metrics are restricted to predict within 2 hops, thus, only social
strength and Katz results appear for 3 hops. We see that for both 2- and 3-hop path predictions, overall the
accuracies of the social strength metric are higher than the other three metrics’ in most of the scenarios,
reaching a maximum of 0.753 with social strength metric in the 2-hop path prediction. The only exception
occurs with 3-hop paths prediction where Katz shows minor advantage than social strength. Although 3-hop
predictions show decreased accuracy compared to 2-hop results, they remain above 0.50.
Table 5.2: Link prediction results. Results of link prediction between pairs of n-hop distant users. Adamic-
Adar: AA, Jaccard: J, Unweighted Social Strength: UWSS. Only the UWSS and Katz metrics are applicable
to n = 3. DT: Decision Tree, LR: Logistic Regression.
Network n Classifier Metric Precision Recall F-Measure AUC
Higgs-Twitter
2
DT
UWSS 0.692±0.001 0.651±0.003 0.631±0.004 0.653±0.006
AA 0.616±0.005 0.585±0.008 0.555±0.005 0.642±0.004
J 0.621±0.001 0.621±0.001 0.620±0.004 0.621±0.002
Katz 0.500±0.000 0.500±0.000 0.405±0.000 0.500±0.000
LR
UWSS 0.695±0.002 0.674±0.002 0.664±0.002 0.753±0.001
AA 0.521±0.001 0.515±0.001 0.480±0.001 0.510±0.002
J 0.619±0.001 0.611±0.001 0.604±0.001 0.678±0.001
Katz 0.726±0.004 0.502±0.000 0.339±0.000 0.502±0.000
3
DT
UWSS 0.695±0.037 0.566±0.026 0.471±0.049 0.578±0.029
Katz 0.500±0.001 0.50±0.001 0.405±0.001 0.500±0.001
LR
UWSS 0.637±0.126 0.609±0.103 0.581±0.114 0.623±0.120
Katz 0.606±0.073 0.589±0.070 0.552±0.102 0.628±0.063
From all these results, we conclude that indirect ties have potential in controlling the flow of information
in the network that should not be ignored. More importantly, our social strength, as an indirect tie measure-
ment, is useful to predict who will be the spreader, or along which paths information propagates, at least 2-3
steps before a susceptible node is even in contact with a spreading node.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we empirically examine the predictive power of indirect ties in network dynamics. By
using four real-world social network datasets and three indirect measurements, we empirically show that
indirect ties can be used for predicting the newly formed edges and the stronger an indirect tie is, the quicker
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the tie will form a link. In addition, strong indirect ties correlate to more interactions, and the interaction
has the tendency to be continued after the link formed. Finally, we show that indirect ties can also be used
for predicting information diffusion paths in social networks.
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Figure 5.6: Performance of 2-hop information diffusion paths prediction. Performance of different measures
of strength for 2-hop indirect ties, in the prediction of information diffusion paths in the networks CA-I, CA-
II and TF2.
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Figure 5.7: Performance of 3-hop information diffusion paths prediction. Performance of different measures
of strength for 3-hop indirect ties, in the prediction of information diffusion paths in the networks CA-I, CA-
II and TF2.
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CHAPTER 6
THE POWER OF INDIRECT TIES IN FRIEND-TO-FRIEND SYSTEMS1
Cloud storage services, such as Dropbox, Amazon S3, and CrashPlan, are attractive for their relatively
low cost and high quality-of-service guarantees. The problem, however, with all centrally managed such
services is the single point of failure. As recent events showed, services can be taken down for legal reasons
and with them all users’ data, or be subjected to uncomfortable scrutiny by the government.
For these reasons, the alternative of Friend-to-Friend (F2F) storage systems [99], where users leverage
social incentives to get access to the available storage resources of their friends, becomes more appealing.
F2F storage systems use declared social relations to solve some enduring problems in decentralized systems,
such as incentives for cooperation and privacy disclosures.
The challenge with F2F storage systems is that they typically provide poor quality of service. The main
reasons that prevent F2F storage systems to achieve at least the QoS of peer-to-peer systems are the small
size of the friendsets of most users [121] and the synchronized online availability patterns of friends [124].
Immediate consequences are low availability and low storage utilization [129]. One solution to mitigate
this poor QoS is to use cloud storage as a fall-back alternative to ensure better data availability, as shown
in [123, 173].
Instead, we propose a solution that addresses the very problem of F2F storage systems by extending the
group of storage candidates to socially-incentivized n-hop-away users (n ≥ 2). This approach is motivated
by the observation that, in real life, favors are often made to friends of friends, depending on the strengths
of the relationships involved. A user’s indirect relations can be potentially more socially “close” than his
or her directly connected friends. At the same time, these indirect relations contribute in ways the direct
friends cannot: with new information and extra resources, or, specific to storage sharing, by being online at
different times, and thus potentially increasing availability.
1Much of the work in this chapter was first published in [132, 133]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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These observations have led to propose a method that recruits socially distant nodes as data placement
candidates based on the social strength between the user and those nodes’ owners [151, 152]. The com-
putation of this metric is fully localized and adaptive to the social neighborhood of each user. We show
experimentally using three real networks in Chapter 3 that this approach (1) provides a larger candidate set
to most users; (2) can significantly improve data availability; and (3) makes better use of existing resources
in the system by better engaging the socially poorly connected users.
6.1 Indirect Ties Expand Friendset in Friend-to-Friend Storage Systems
Friend-to-Friend (F2F) storage systems were shown to suffer from two significant limitations. First,
users with a small set of friends are penalized by lack of available storage for their needs, while users with
many friends get overloaded with resource requests. This further results in imbalanced load distribution and
low resource utilization. Second, friends are typically in close geographical proximity to each others, and
thus their online times are synchronized, leading to low data availability during off time.
This work addresses these concerns by expanding the set of storage resources while still using a mea-
sure of social incentives. It proposes an indirect tie measurement to compute the social strength between
possibly distant nodes in a social network. Using datasets from co-authorship networks and a video gaming
community, we show that the social strength-based mechanism more than doubles the set of storage candi-
dates motivated by social incentives, invites socially-low connected users to contribute significantly more
resources (by up to 16 fold), and improves data availability by up to 6.5 times. We also show that simple
strategies can significantly improve peer engagement and workload distribution in social strength-based F2F
storage systems.
F2F systems are distributed systems where social incentives encourage users to provide resources from
their local machines to their friends. For example, Tribler [174] is a friend-based P2P file sharing system,
which relies on friends’ similar taste in content to encourage altruistic behavior; Turtle [175] leverages users’
pre-existent trust relationships to supply safe sharing of sensitive data.
Although a promising alternative to cloud-based data backup, F2F storage systems were shown to suffer
from two significant limitations. First, users with a small set of friends are penalized by lack of available
storage for their needs, resulting in low resource utilization [99]. Second, friends are typically in close
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geographical proximity, and thus their online times are synchronized, leading to high unavailability to their
friends’ data [124]. These concerns can intuitively be addressed by leveraging social strength (SSn) to
expand the set of resources while still using a measure of social incentives.
In this section, we verify whether our social strength metric can improve the service performance in F2F
storage systems. To maintain a meaningful value of social incentives, we restrict our evaluations to n = 2
and n = 3. Our objectives are:
• To understand if SSn expands the size of candidate sets.
• To evaluate the benefits of using SSn to improve data availability in F2F systems.
6.1.1 Social Strength Expands Users’ Friendsets
In the following, we experimentally show how social strength can be used for expanding users’ friendsets
in the system.
In the following, we state our friendset expansion algorith. Some socially aware systems have explored
indirect ties among users in the design of their systems. Some previous work directly involves all of a user’s
friends-of-friends (or even longer distant relationships) [174]. This naive friend sets expansion scheme could
enlarge many users’ friend sets, specifically in networks where most of their nodes’ shortest paths are larger
than the length of the expansion. However, not every 2- or 3-hop distant friend has enough incentives, for
example, for storing data, hosting computation tasks, or routing messages. Therefore, instead of directly
involving all of a user’s indirect ties within some radius, we use the quantitative power of the social strength
metric, SSn, to select socially “close” distant nodes, that is, indirect connections with comparable social
strength with the user’s direct (1-hop) friends. However, even a user’s indirect contacts could have no
willlingness to share their resource. To consider such uncertainty of resource sharing among indirect ties,
we extend our expansion algorithm in [133] by introducing a degree of uncertainty into the estimation of
trust.
The expansion algorithm follows three steps:
• For each user i, find the weakest direct social contact p such that NW (i, p) = min
j∈Neigh(i)
[NW (i, j)].
Let this minimum normalized weight be referred to as θi.
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• For each m of i’s n-hop friends, if SSn(i,m) ≥ θi, the user m is inserted in the candidate peer set of
i. Intuitively, this ensures that the social strength between i and m, located at distance n in the social
graph, is at least as strong as i’s weakest direct tie.
• For each users’ n-hop friend peer set, only 1-u (u is the degree of uncertainty) fraction of peers are
randomly selected as trust candidates for resource sharing.
We note that the algorithm expands each candidate set using a user-specific, thus local, threshold. Such
local thresholds are needed in the distributed setting of a F2F system.
The online game interacting friends network, TF2 (introduced in Chapter 3) also supplies each player’s
online/offline status that can be used for the data availability experiments presented later, in Section 6.1.2.
However, the face-to-face contact network of Infectious Exhibition (IE) (used in Chapter 3) is an ephemeral
offline social network, which does not include any users’ online activities. Thus, the IE network is not
suitable for our later experiments, and thus we did not use it for the evaluation of the friendset expansion.
Instead, we use two co-authorship networks CA-I and CA-II. Nodes in this graph represent authors and are
labeled with the author’s affiliation. We map each author’s affiliation information to a timezone, which can
be further used in simulating users’ online/offline behaviors in Section 6.1.2. To expand users’ peersets with
uncertainty, we added different degrees of uncertainty in trust estimation, i.e., u = 0.1, 0.3, 0.6.
In the following, we present the expansion results. Since the most intuitive advantage of our mechanism
is an increase in the number of storage candidates, we begin by evaluating how much the candidate set is
expanded. We thus implemented SSn(i,m) presented in Chapter 4 and report the size of the candidate set
selected based on the expansion algorithm presented in Section 6.2.1 on the three networks described in
Chapter 3.
Table 6.1 shows how candidate sets are expanded with 2- and 3-hop social distance respectively in
each of our three networks. For 2-hop expansion without uncertainty, 63.62% users in CA-II and 36.6%
of players in TF2 expanded their candidate sets. Even in the sparse CA-I, 34.19% users augmented their
friend sets. After adding uncertainties in the friendset expansion algorithm, percentages of expanded users
decrease. But this only happens when the degree of uncertainty (u) is larger than 0.6, that is more than
60% of selected peers refuse to share their resource. The degree of uncertainty barely influences expansions
when the uncertainty values are 0.1 and 0.3.
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Table 6.1: Statistics of candidate set expansion. Candidate set expansion via SS2 (only 2-hop friends) and
SS3 (only 3-hop friends): percentage of expanded users, expansion nodes and rate.
uncertainty network expanded users expansion: med, max expansion rate: med, avg, max
n=2 n=3 n=2 n=3 n=2 n=3
None
CA-I 34.19% 10.67 0, 19 0, 24 0, 0.19, 1.58 0, 0.12, 2.00
CA-II 63.62% 51.20 3, 459 27, 872 0.5, 1.3, 6.1 4.29, 9.00, 41.79
TF2 36.60% 27.20 0, 1593 0, 1032 0, 2.5, 36 0, 10.94, 159.2
0.1%
CA-I 34.19% 10.67 0, 17 0, 22 0, 0.18, 1.42 0, 0.11, 1.83
CA-II 63.62% 51.20 3, 413 24, 785 0.5, 1.14, 5.5 3.83, 8.11, 37.64
TF2 36.57% 27.20 0, 1434 0, 1032 0, 2.25, 32.5 0, 9.85, 143.2
0.3%
CA-I 34.19% 10.67 0, 13 0, 17 0, 0.13, 1.08 0, 0.09, 1.42
CA-II 63.62% 51.20 2, 321 19, 610 0.36, 0.89, 4.29 3.00, 6.31, 29.29
TF2 36.57% 27.20 0, 692 0, 1115 0, 1.75, 25.00 0, 7.66, 111.4
0.6%
CA-I 21.60% 7.39 0, 8 0, 10 0, 0.06, 0.67 0, 0.04, 0.83
CA-II 56.97% 48.47 1, 184 11, 349 0.22, 0.50, 2.47 1.71, 3.60, 16.71
TF2 30.38% 35.45 0, 395 0, 637 0, 0.98, 14.5 0, 4.38, 63.60
When considering the expansion (no uncertainty is considered) brought in by 3-hop distant nodes p who
satisfy the requirement that SS3(i, p) ≥ θ(i) the expansion is still taking place in all three networks: even
in the sparse network CA-I, 10.6% users augment their friendsets and about 1% users have expanded their
candidates with more than five friends. The denser network CA-II has more than 50% of users expanding
their candidate sets, and TF2 has 27.2% (with the number of expanded 3-hop friends being 1,032). With
the increase of uncertainty, the sparse CA-I has more percentage of users reduce their expanded peers, from
10.67% with zero uncertainty to 7.39% with uncertainty value of 0.6, compared to dense CA-II and TF2.
Meanwhile, Figure 6.1 also plots the degree of a user vs. the size of her expanded candidate set. For the
most part, all users expand their candidate set, with CA-II showing linear growth in 2-hop distance as the
user’s degree increases. Even the 3-hop expansion presents positive correlation with nodes’ degree.
All in all, as expected, 3-hop augmentation is not as strong as 2 hops’ since as the social distance
increases, the social strength weakens. Yet a number of users can still recruit more peers when increasing the
social distance. In addition, if users have a large number of peers for resource sharing, a small (or median)
degree of uncertainty seldom affects friendset expansions. Thus, using social strength for recruiting peers
indirectly connected in the social graph augments users’ peer-sets and potentially solves problems caused
by the limited number of friends in F2F systems.
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6.1.2 Expanded Friendsets Improve Data Availability
Expanding the candidate set is a necessary but insufficient solution for improving the performance of
F2F systems. In particular, as shown in the context of F2F storage systems, F2F service availability depends
on user online activity patterns [124, 125].
In this section we show that a larger resource candidate set can significantly improve data availability
in F2F systems. We stress that we do not propose a cohesive mechanism that improves the performance
of F2F systems. Instead, we focus on exploring the potential of using social strength (via the expansion
algorithm) in F2F solutions. Thus, the following sections show that data availability under a previously
proposed replica allocation strategy increases significantly compared with “traditional” 1-hop F2F. In the
following section, our augmented candidate (friends) sets refer to users that have expanded their friend sets
with our expansion algorithm up to 3-hop social distance.
We simulate users’ online presence and data placement to estimate file availability in F2F storage sys-
tems with service candidate sets augmented by social strength. To estimate peer availability, we augment
each network with online presence empirically deduced from real traces. For CA-I and CA-II, we fit a
distribution to online presence information extracted from empirical Skype traces presented in [124]. The
distribution was applied to each author by shifting it to match the timezone of his or her affiliation. As seen
in Figure 6.2, which plots the percentage of users online per hour of the day, at least 25% of nodes are online
at any given time, with the peak and valley occurring at about 1:00 AM and noon, respectively. For the TF2
network, we use one month of recorded playing times. We plot the corresponding aggregate distribution
in Figure 6.3, which shows each week’s online presence per hour for May 2011. The distribution shows
clear diurnal and domain-specific activity patterns. As noted in [134], gaming is not an activity conducive to
multi-tasking. Therefore, we see an elevated level of presence on weekends and during non-working hours.
Although peak presence occurs consistently in the early morning with more than 20% of users online, there
are almost no users online at noon.
To determine whether the social strength selection mechanism improves the availability of storage re-
sources, we measure the percentage of a node’s selected candidates available throughout the day, by binning
online presence into 1-hour time slots. We also map each user’s affiliation to a timezone, then match the
timezone to an hour of a day. If a user is online at some point during a time slot, we mark him as available
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for that time slot. For CA-I and CA-II networks, in each time slot, we randomly select users to be online but
keep the same percentage of online users from the Skype trace. We repeat this random sampling process for
multiple iterations to obtain stable results. Methods that store files in a distributed fashion such as erasure
codes require k storage sites to be available for retrieving a file [176]. Thus, we also vary the number of
friends necessary for a node’s storage needs to be met under such storage schemes. We then measure the
fraction of nodes who have enough candidates online to meet their needs when selected by either the pure
F2F approach or the social strength mechanism.
Replicating data across all friends allows a user to get maximum achievable data coverage but results in
high costs for storing and transferring data to multiple copies, in particular for users with a large number of
friends. So we adopt the greedy heuristic data placement algorithm proposed in [125] to backup files with a
subset of friends who can cover the maximum online time. In this heuristic, to get maximum possible time
slots coverage (e.g., 24 hours), users first pick a set of friends who are able to cover at least one unique time
slot that other friends cannot cover. If this set of friends cannot cover all the time slots, then select other
friends to cover the remaining uncovered time slots and keep doing this until all the time slots are covered
or no friends can cover the uncovered time slots.
6.1.2.1 Data Availability
Some methods store files in a distributed fashion such as erasure codes that require k storage sites to be
available for retrieving a file [176]. We vary the number of friends necessary for a nodes storage needs to be
met under such storage schemes. We measure the fraction of nodes who have enough candidates online to
meet their needs when selected by either the pure F2F approach or the social strength mechanism. We com-
pare three scenarios: 1) storage candidates selected only from direct social contacts; 2) storage candidates
selected from the SSn-based expanded candidate set,with n = 2 and 3) n = 3. Figures 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 plot
the average fraction of users whose storage needs are met with the requirement that at least k ∈ {1, 3, 6}
candidates are online at a given time for the co-authorship networks and TF2, respectively. Error bars repre-
sent the 95% confidence interval on average. Three scenarios are compared: 1) storage candidates selected
only from direct social contacts, storage candidates selected from the SSn-based expanded candidate set,
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with 2) n = 2 and 3) n = 3. Three different degrees of uncertainty (u) are considered, i.e., u = 0.1, 0.3 and
0.6.
Using the expanded candidate set results in higher service availability. In particular, when 6 friends
are needed to cooperate on completing a storage task, about 4 times higher data availability can be reached
in CA-I, 1.6 times higher in CA-II and 6.5 times higher in TF2. Further, the social strength mechanism
does not degrade as quickly as the 1-hop selection when increasing the number of friends that are required
to be online simultaneously. We also see that for sparse networks like CA-I, social strength over larger
distance n improves data availability, especially when larger number of friends are required to be online
simultaneously.
Finally, CA-II shows higher levels of availability than CA-I under the same conditions. This is likely
because CA-II has more users with larger expanded candidate sets under the social strength mechanism
than CA-I (Figure 3.1). Moreover, we note that CA-I shows better performance than TF2 under the same
requirements. In the scenario that requires at least one friend online, 73% of users in CA-I have candidates
available at midnight, compared to only 20% of TF2 users. One explanation could be the limited number
of concurrent players the gaming server supports (at most 32 simultaneous players). Another explanation
is that CA-I users are spread out over multiple timezones, while most of the TF2 users are geographically
close to the server to minimize latency, and thus are time synchronized in their gaming patterns.
For scenarios with uncertainty, when uncertainty is 0.1, data availability has almost no decrease of all
three datasets, even the uncertainty value increases to 0.3, less than 10% of data availability is reduced. With
the uncertainty value continues increasing to 0.6, data availability by to 10% to 15%.
To conclude, using datasets from co-authorship networks and a video gaming community, we show that
the social strength-based algorithm more than doubles the set of storage candidates potentially motivated by
social incentives, and increases data availability by up to three times compared to the pure F2F approach.
6.1.3 Peer Engagement and Workload Distribution
As previously noted and as Table 6.1 confirms, in F2F systems the load placed on a peer is directly
related to the peer’s degree, i.e., nodes with high degree are the ones most often chosen while resources from
low degree nodes are almost never requested. As a result, F2F systems suffer from low resource utilization
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and imbalanced workload distribution. For example, Friendstore [121] has low resource utilization (87%)
compared to storage systems such as DHash [126], Pastry [177] and OpenDHT [128], which can achieve
perfect utilization.
Expanding the candidate set shifts some of the load to low-degree peers, as they will be included in the
candidate set of more peers, but does the same to high-degree peers, that will be even more overloaded.
Although the candidate sets of high-degree users expand more than those of low-degree users (shown in
Figure 6.1), a modified selection strategy could improve the utilization rate. One straightforward candidate
selection strategy is giving high priority to low-degree users at the initial phase. Then, if all of a peer’s
friends have already contributed, friends with the lowest load will be chosen. We name this candidate
selection scheme Low Degree First then Low Workloads First (LDLW).
Workload distribution and resource utilization in distributed systems depend on many factors, such as
user requests, resource distribution, network characteristics, etc. To isolate the effect of social strength-
expanded candidate set from other factors, we assume the following experiments are in a homogeneous
environment: all peers issue the same number of resource request, bandwidth and storage are unlimited, and
files are equal in size. In the following we refer to peer engagement as the fraction of contributing peers in
the system. We measure peer engagement in simple F2F systems and in expanded F2F systems in the same
networks as above, when we vary the number of fragments (“friends” in F2F systems) needed for replication
with erasure code [178] and under two load allocation schemes: random and LDLW.
Figure 6.7 plots peer engagement across all three networks in our experiments. The general trend is that
the traditional F2F system has lower peer engagement than the augmented F2F under the random load allo-
cation, especially when the number of required peers for storage availability increases (e.g., CA-I and TF2).
The augmented F2F solution implemented with the LDLW scheme strikingly improves peer engagement,
especially when the number of backup friends is 6: CA-I’s utilization rate jumps from 71.7% in 1 hop to
93.4%, CA-II achieves the biggest value at 99.3%, and TF2 shows the largest increment that raises from
traditional F2F’s 39.2% to augmented F2F’s 94.8%.
There are two reasons behind this phenomenon. First, users’ expanded friend sets supply more opportu-
nities for users to donate their resources. In particular, when more friends are needed, some low-degree users
in the traditional F2F scenario are punished by lack of resources due to few directly connected friends. The
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second is related to specifics of our test networks. CA-II has more users with expanded friend sets (63.6%
in Table 6.1) and TF2 has a larger friends expansion rate. Therefore, after friend sets expansion, these two
networks involve more peers supplying backup service and ultimately lead to higher peer engagement.
The LDLW scheme achieves a better utilization rate than the randomized scheme. Additionally, if the
size of a user’s directly connected friends is large enough to satisfy their service demands, the traditional and
the augmented F2F systems demonstrate similar resource utilization rates. However, when more peers are
simultaneously needed (e.g., increase replica in the system), the augmented F2F implemented with LDLW
scheme shows its an enhancement in peer engagement.
To conclude, by enlarging peers’ friend sets, the overall peer engagement increases compared to tra-
ditional F2F systems and leads to increased resource utilization. In addition, the simple LDLW candidate
selection scheme improves even more peer engagement.
Another way to look at the benefits of our approach is to understand how a user’s position in the network
affects the workload of his associated peer. This is important because many social networks display a heavy-
tailed degree distribution. That is, a few nodes have a very high degree while many have a low degree. We
address this by placing users into 5 bins representing the percentile rank of their degree centrality.
Figure 6.8 plots average workload for peers in each bin for the aforementioned candidate selection
methods. As we increase the number of required friends (the columns in the figure) the workload increases
across all groups of users for the random selection mechanism. With the random selection schemes, we
see a skewed load distribution due to the skewed degree distribution. For example, the peers in the highest
degree bin have about 62 times more workload than those in the lowest degree bin for TF2.
Our proposed LDLW selection scheme, however, is effective at evenly distributing loads among all de-
gree bins. For all three networks, the load across bins are comparable, with the largest improvement occur-
ring in the CA-II network. In CA-II, our LDLW solution doubles the average workload of the lowest degree
bin compared to the 1-hop random selection scheme and has a 1.7 times improvement when compared to
random selection from social strength augmented candidate sets. Increasing the average contribution of
low-degree users thus helps balance load distribution by shifting workloads away from high-degree users.
As high-degree users have more connected friends they thus have more opportunities to satisfy their
service requests. Low-degree users, on the other hand, struggle with finding enough incentivized friends
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for backing up files. Additionally, the bootstrapping issue [179] that new users face not only impacts their
service, but can also result in the system failing. New users with few contacts suffer from poor service,
which might result in them abandoning the service before it reaches critical mass. In addition to balancing
workload distributions, our social strength solution can improve low-degree users’ service fulfillment rate.
We define fulfillment rate as the fraction of users whose service requests are met. Figure 6.9 compares
the lowest degree rank users’ (the 80-100 bin in Figure 6.8) service fulfillment rate for general F2F systems
and social strength augmented F2F with the random scheme, and our social strength solution. Because of
the skewed degree distribution, this bin represents the overwhelming majority of our networks (82%, 78%,
and 91% in CA-I, CA-II, and TF2, respectively). Thus, the 0 to 82.6% increase in fulfillment when 6 friends
are needed exhibited in CA-I, for example, represents a substantial improvement for most users.
6.2 Summary
In this chapter, we used the social strength metric that introduced in Chapter 4 to extend the candidate
sets for users in a F2F system while preserving the social incentives that are the very motivation of F2F
systems. Specifically, by considering both the intensity of interactions and the number of connected paths,
we extend the candidate set of a user to include, in addition to his direct contacts in the social network,
peers located n-hop away with whom the user has a social strength higher than the social strength of his
weakest direct contact. This approach allows users access to many more resources, involves the lonely users
to contribute resources to the system (by up to a factor of 16), and significantly improves the potential for
higher availability by expanding the geographical coverage of the candidate set. While we evaluated this
method in isolation, it can be used with cloud storage as a backup, as proposed in [180]. In this situation,
our approach will reduce the costs of transferring data from the cloud by providing higher data availability
from the F2F storage infrastructure. Our idea can be used for other F2F systems, not only storage. For
example, in the newly emerging peer-sharing economy, it can function as a filter of trust for the initiation
of a new commercial relationship, especially when the social graph is aggregated from multiple sources.
The costs of using the social strength metric is computation complexity, especially in large-scale, dense
networks. Building a practical framework that enables fast implementation on large-scale, dense networks
is necessary.
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Figure 6.1: Expanded candidate set size as a function of node degree.
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Figure 6.2: Online behavior of nodes in empirical traces of Skype.
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Figure 6.3: Online behavior of players per hour of the week in May for TF2.
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Figure 6.4: Average fraction of available candidates per hour for CA-I. u is the parameter for uncertainty.
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Figure 6.5: Average fraction of available candidates per hour for CA-II. u is the parameter for uncertainty.
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Figure 6.6: Average fraction of available candidates per hour of the week for TF2. u is the parameter for
uncertainty.
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Figure 6.8: Degree rank as a function of average workloads in three scenarios. (1) 1-hop F2F with random
scheme (2) social strength augmented F2F with random scheme (3) social strength augmented F2F with
LDLW scheme.
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Figure 6.9: Low-degree Peers service fulfillment rate. When 3 and 6 friends are required for backup ser-
vice(peer degree is a logarithmic scale).
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CHAPTER 7
THE CONTAGION OF UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR1
Unethical behavior raises significant issues in society, it is prevalent [181], yet it is difficult to quantify
and accurately model. This difficulty is due to many factors, ranging from the difficulty to identify it to the
difficulty to classify it: is taking a pen from the office more unethical than lying in a political campaign?
However, understanding unethical behavior and identifying the factors that trigger or prevent it in various
circumstances can have significant impact in many areas of life, from education to sports.
Cheating, as one type of unethical behavior, is defined as the act of breaking the rules in order to gain
unfair advantage in a situation. Studying cheating online, where all interactions leave a digital mark, be-
comes a promising approach for understanding this behavior in real life. Gaming market was worth around
$91.5 billion in 2015 [182]. Gaming popularity transcends geography, age and gender: in 2011, the average
age of American gamers (who make us the biggest market) was 37, 72% of households played games, and
female players accounted for 42% of them [183].
Understanding cheating in online games is in itself of interest for the gaming industry, but several other
characteristics make it an ideal phenomenon to study. First, ties in this social network are supported by
real (gaming) interactions [134], which differentiates it from declared social networks like Facebook [13].
This translates into slightly different, and, we believe, more realistic social network structures. Second,
researchers consider that in-game behavior closely mirrors real-world social behavior [184]. Studying a
gaming network is particularly interesting because of the competitive nature of many multiplayer games, a
feature that has parallels in the offline world, for instance, corruption in cases such as Enron, where “internal
[group] competition could set the stage for the diffusion of ‘widespread unethical behavior’ ” [92]. Under
this assumption, results from real life experiments should be valid in this environment and vice-versa. Third,
1Much of the work in this chapter will be published in [130].
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cheating in online games is widespread [185], which makes it easier to observe and measure over limited
intervals of times.
In this work we collect and analyze a large-scale dataset that includes a significant number of instances
of cheating behavior from the Steam Community (http://steamcommunity.com), the world’s most popular
online gaming platform. Drawing from the sociology and psychology literature, we tested several factors
that motivate cheating but have remained untested outside of controlled laboratory experiments and small,
survey-based studies.
Our empirical observations lead to the following contributions:
• We quantitatively characterize the spreading of cheating behavior in an interaction-based network of
gamers. While we have shown cheating as a social contagion in a friendship network [18,144], in this
work we observe a different contagion process by looking at the interaction network, a more likely
platform for this contagion to happen.
• We verify that players’ cheating engagement can be significantly increased with exposure to neighbors
who cheat and have not been punished.
• We confirm that in-group social contacts have larger influence in inspiring cheating than do outsiders.
• We measure the influence that the penalty for cheating has on adopting this behavior.
• We compare the adoption of cheating behavior across different classes of players.
• We empirically present friendship age has impact on cheating contagion.
• We investigate subtle structural connectivity in indicating the influence of cheater neighbors.
Our findings lead to a better understanding of what are the factors that affect people’s engagement in
unethical behavior, and pave the ways in which cheating detection/prevention mechanisms can be improved
in real life.
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7.1 Methodology
We collected data about online gamers from different sources and processed it to cover for some miss-
ing information, as described below. We collected data from two different sources: the Steam platform
where users buy games and maintain Steam Community profiles; and a third-party service that aggregates
information about real-time playing status on many gaming servers around the world that host 26 highly
popular games. Among these 26 games, many are notorious for having been infested with cheating: e.g.,
Counter-Strike:Global Offensive, Team Fortress 2, and Counter-Strike 1.6. More details are presented in
Chapter 3.
7.1.1 The Influence Timing Condition
Valve does not post the VAC-ban on a cheater’s profile immediately after observing cheating, but with
varying delays of days or even weeks [140]. To understand who cheats first and thus who influences and
who is influenced, we need to know the time when cheating or communication about cheating occurred. To
compensate for this missing piece of information, we estimate the time of cheating using a parameter w that
limits the difference in the delays with which the cheating label was applied to any two gamers. We call it
the influencing time.
Specifically, assuming player A cheated at time CA and is labeled at time TA (TA > CA, visible in
our records as posted on the Steam Community profile) and player B was VAC-banned at time TB , we
consider B being potentially influenced (to cheat or to refrain from cheating) by A’s cheating if and only
if: TB < TA ± w. This condition provisions for the situation in which despite the fact that A cheated first,
the VAC-ban on A’s profile was posted after the VAC-ban on B’s profile (thus, TB < TA). Since the delays
with which the labels are applied are limited to a difference w, then TA > TB − w.
7.2 Cheating as a Complex Contagion
Cheating as a contagious process has been evidenced in real life. For example, research into academic
cheating indicates the presence of a network effect: the acceptance of a single high school cheater into
a United States military service academy has been shown to cause a statistically significant 0.37 to 0.47
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additional students to cheat [186]. A study of 158 private universities [187] shows that observing other
undergraduate students cheat is strongly correlated with one’s own cheating behavior.
Previous work [18, 144] shows cheating is a contagion process as evidenced by the friendship relations
in Steam Community. The phenomenon was observed by hazard analysis with two datasets collected from
Steam Community’s friendship network in spring 2011 and August 2012. Here, we verify cheating in
online gaming environment is a contagion with a more accurate dataset that includes newly released VAC-
ban labeling times. Moreover, we confirm this phenomenon on two networks that connect the same players.
More importantly, this is the first time to study the cheating contagion in the co-match network, a likely
more precise indication of how cheating spreads.
In the following, we introduce our method. We analyze the relationship between a user’s adoption
probability of cheating behavior and the number of the user’s cheater neighbors. We follow the methodol-
ogy in [86, 87, 188]. We consider user A has one exposure to cheating every time one of its neighbors is
VAC-banned. The probability of adopting the cheating behavior after k exposures, P (k), is defined as the
fraction of users who are labeled as cheaters after exactly k exposures to cheating. Specifically, P (k) =
Adoption(k)
Exposure(k) , where Exposure(k) is the number of users who have exactly k cheaters in their neighborhood,
and Adoption(k) is the number of users k-exposed to cheating who become cheaters before the (k + 1)-th
exposure.
When we consider exposures in the friendship network, we assume that all of a player’s neighbors
observe when the player is VAC-banned. In reality, the change of status is not broadcasted, and it can only
be noticed by looking at the Steam Community profile or when playing together in particular games. Thus,
without timing information and no proof of observation or interaction, the exposure function (Exposure(k))
simply counts the number of cheater neighbors of each player. The co-match network, on the other hand,
records much richer time-based interaction information among players. We use these times interactions as
the vehicle for contagion and apply the time windows as explained in the previous section to estimate who
influences whom.
Figure 7.1 shows behavior adoption probability (P (k)) as a function of k cheater neighbors in the two
networks. We observe two key features from the P (k) curve shapes. First, both networks present an in-
creased probability of cheating adoption as the number of cheater neighbors increases. These results suggest
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Figure 7.1: The exposure response function. The exposure response function of players who adopted the
cheating behavior after k-exposure to cheater neighbors with six different time windows in the friendship
and co-match network respectively. The adoption probability is the fraction of users who adopt cheating
behavior directly after their kth observation of it. The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval.
a complex contagion [84]: as unaccepted social behavior, cheating needs social affirmation from multiple
sources and presents an increased likelihood of adoption with each additional exposure. That is, a player is
more likely to engage in cheating if two of his neighbors cheat than when one of his neighbors cheats.
Second, the co-match network shows a different contagion process compared to the friendship net-
work. Contagion arrives at its peak values for two exposures to cheating, and then decays. This shows an
over-exposure trend—increases in exposure dramatically suppress contagion [87]. Similar over-exposure
phenomena were also observed in the information diffusion process of other online social networks such as
Twitter, Digg [87] and Flicker [82].
7.3 Factors That Influence Cheating Engagement
According to the results just presented, cheating in Steam Community spreads as a complex contagion
and is associated with the effect of exposure on individuals. In this section we investigate under what
conditions, given the exposure to cheating, a player tends to cheat or tends to refrain from cheating. To this
end, we rely on results from sociology and psychology to formulate a number of hypotheses that we test
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empirically, using the co-match network. Our dataset includes all crawled 26 games thus the analysis results
can generalize to other online games.
7.3.1 Factor I: Observing Unpunished Cheaters Aggravates Cheating
We hypothesize that observing unpunished cheaters in action increases the likelihood of cheating. This
hypothesis is supported by Gino et al. [96] who showed with in-lab, controlled experiments with human
subjects that after observing people who cheated and were not punished, the subjects were more likely to
cheat. The controlled experiment involved 141 subjects who were asked to solve 20 matrix problems in
5 minutes and were invited to take money as payment, according to how many problems they (claimed
to have) solved, at the rate of $0.5 for each correct solution. The whole process was self-reported and
nobody checked the solutions. However, it was impossible to solve all the problems in the time allocated.
Only 1 minute in the experiment, a hired actor claimed to have finished all problems correctly and took the
maximum possible payment, $10. In this scenario, all the other participants observed that the actor cheated
without any punishment.
For testing this hypothesis, we process the dataset in a way that replicates the experiment just described.
The assumptions are the following: (i) if VAC-banned during our 32-day observation period, we assume
a player cheats in all matches played before he is VAC-banned; (2) we assume all players with whom the
cheater played before being VAC-banned noticed he was cheating (and not punished); (iii) we assume all
players who have not been VAC-banned by the end of our observation time never cheated (and thus were
not seen cheating by their co-players); (iv) we consider all players who get VAC-banned in an interval that
satisfies the influence timing condition and played with the recently VAC-banned player were influenced by
him. These assumptions overestimate a cheater’s influence, thus the influence is an upper bound.
Under these assumptions, players’ neighbors are divided into two categories: neighbors who cheated
without being caught at match time and neighbors who did not cheat. We compare the fractions of players
who turned cheaters and have neighbors in one of the categories above: at least one has been cheating or
none has been cheating.
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Figure 7.2: The cheating adoption results of factor I. The cheating adoption fraction of players who observed
their neighbors’ cheating without being caught in the match vs. those who had not observed any cheating.
Figure 7.2 plots users’ adoption of cheating as a function of number of their observed unpunished cheater
neighbors. The details of statistics of players involved in this factor are given in Table 7.1. The results of
Figure 7.2 is supported by Table 7.1. Three observations can be drawn.
First, overall, compared to no exposure to cheating, players who observed other players’ cheating behav-
ior are more likely to cheat themselves. These results confirm the hypothesis and thus the in-lab experiments
in Gino et al.’s study.
Second, when the number of observed uncaught cheaters changes from one to two, there is a dramatic
increase in the likelihood of adopting the cheating behavior. For example, the change of cheating after
observing two unpunished cheaters is 10 times larger than when observing one unpunished cheater for a
time window of 0 (that is, under the assumption that all VAC-bans are delayed by the same).
Third, the adoption of cheating decreases when players are exposed to three cheaters compared to when
they are exposed to two. Even so, the likelihood to cheat is at least 11.8 times higher than when there is no
exposure to unpunished cheating. This can be explained by the over-exposure phenomena in the co-match
graph of Figure 7.1, where repeated exposures have decaying effects on users’ adoption. (We note that this
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Table 7.1: Summary of players satisfying conditions in factor I. TW: Time Window, C: Cheater, NC: Non-
Cheater.
Condition TW # of Observed Cheaters # of Player
observed cheating without punishment 0 day
0 147,727 (857 C + 146,870 NC)
1 5,416 (26 C + 5,309 NC)
2 416 (74 C + 342 NC)
3 45 (4 C + 41 NC)
observed cheating without punishment 7 days
0 147,336 (466 C + 146,870 NC)
1 3,085 (20 C + 3,065 NC)
2 218 (38 C + 180 NC)
3 26 (4 C + 22 NC)
observed cheating without punishment 14 days
0 147,200 (330 C + 146,870 NC)
1 2,048 (17 C + 2,031 NC)
2 172 (32 C + 140 NC)
3 20 (3 C + 17 NC)
observed cheating without punishment 21 days
0 147,144 (274 C + 146,870 NC)
1 1,761 (13 C + 1,748 NC)
2 138 (28 C + 110 NC)
3 12 (1 C + 11 NC)
Table 7.2: Chi-square tests in four different time windows.
Freedom Degree χ2 P-value Time Window (day)
2 9185.9 < 2.2e-16 0
2 5291.1 < 2.2e-16 7
2 3417.5 < 2.2e-16 14
2 2987.4 < 2.2e-16 21
scenario of multiple exposures was not tested in [96].) A group of Chi-Square tests shown in Table 7.2 reveal
that the number of cheaters significantly differs with the increase of observed unpunished cheater neighbors.
7.3.2 Factor II: In-group vs. Out-group Influence
We hypothesize that people are influenced by members of their groups more than by out-group members.
Gino et al. [96] discovered the difference between in-group and out-group influence in cheating engagement
by doing the same experiment described in Factor I with one difference: the hired actor was making himself
an in-group or out-group member by wearing a plain T-shirt, or another university’s T-shirt, respectively.
The experimental results support the theory of social norm and social identity [189,190] according to which
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people adopt the behavior of other in-group members and reject the same behavior if manifested by out-
group members.
In most online multiplayer games, players are divided into two teams. In this study we use team mem-
bership information to distinguish between in-group vs. out-group influence in cheating. Even if the teams
are ephemeral, numerous prior studies in social sciences and management have showed that teams affect
players’ in-game performance [191, 192].
We assume that the in-team/out-team influence happens when a player’s teammate/opponent was labeled
as a cheater after their match. To exclude mutual influence between in-team and out-team cheaters at the
same time, we examined players who have either in-team or out-team influence each time. In the analysis,
we compare the fraction of players who were VAC-banned after playing with cheater teammates vs. those
playing with cheater opponents.
As Figure 7.3 shows, across all results in four time windows, the level of cheating is dramatically
influenced by teammates, and the influence is higher with the number of possible observations of cheating.
For example, users’ adoption fraction increases from 0.027 to 0.279 when time window is 0. Our results
confirm the above in-lab experimental results.
Another result (not addressed by Gino et al.) is that an additional in-team or out-team observation after
two times does not affect adoption significantly. This tells us that initial exposures might increase contagion
probability while further exposures appear to saturate contagion. The details of statistics of in-team vs.
out-team players involved in this factor are given in Table 7.3, which supports results in Figure 7.3. We also
give 3D plots of fraction of cheating adoptions under the conditions of different combinations of in-team
vs. out-team influence from Figure 7.4 to Figure 7.7. Overall, the 3D plots still demonstrate that in-team
cheater partners have larger influence than out-team members, which also support our hypothesis.
7.3.3 Factor III: Awareness of Repercussions Limits Cheating
We hypothesize that the possibility of punishment limits cheating. The intuition for this hypothesis is
in the very existence of the VAC-ban label and the consequences associated to it (i.e., playing restrictions).
However, the efficacy of the VAC-ban labels in cheating limitation has not been publicized, if it is known.
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Table 7.3: Summary of players satisfying conditions in factor II. C: Cheater, NC: Non-Cheater.
Condition Time Window # Cheater # of Player
in-team influence 0 day
1 7,244 (199 C + 7,045 NC)
2 962 (253 C + 709 NC)
3 136 (38 C + 98 NC)
4 33 (8 C + 25 NC)
out-team influence 0 day
1 10,183 (260 C + 9,923 NC)
2 1,395 (32 C + 1,363 NC)
3 258 (5 C + 253 NC)
4 57 (0 C + 57 NC)
in-team influence 7 days
1 7,165 (193 C + 6,972 NC)
2 962 (251 C + 711 NC)
3 130 (38 C + 92 NC)
4 33 (8 C + 25 NC)
out-team influence 7 days
1 10,076 (248 C + 9,828 NC)
2 1,374 (32 C + 1,342 NC)
3 253 (5 C + 248 NC)
4 57 (0 C + 57 NC)
in-team influence 14 days
1 7,089 (189 C + 6,900 NC)
2 944 (251 C + 693 NC)
3 125 (35 C + 90 NC)
4 33 (8 C + 25 NC)
out-team influence 14 days
1 9,985 (243 C + 9,742 NC)
2 1,359 (32 C + 1,327 NC)
3 243 (4 C + 239 NC)
4 55 (0 C + 55 NC)
in-team influence 21 days
1 6,938 (175 C + 6,763 NC)
2 910 (244 C + 666 NC)
3 122 (32 C + 90 NC)
4 53 (1 C + 52 NC)
out-team influence 21 days
1 9,780 (235 C + 9,545 NC)
2 1,324 (31 C + 1,293 NC)
3 233 (4 C + 229 NC)
4 52 (1 C + 52 NC)
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Figure 7.3: The cheating adoption results of factor II. The cheating adoption fraction of players who were
exposed to in-team members vs. those who exposed to out-team members in scenarios of four different time
windows.
To measure the effect of the possibility of punishment on cheating adoption, we consider the visibility
of the VAC-ban label to neighbors as such a reminder. This approach makes sense because VAC-bans are
publicly visible regardless of the account’s privacy settings, they are permanent, and they are undesired.
We divide players into two groups: one group of players played with punished cheater players (and thus,
we assume, they observed their VAC-bans), while the others never played with VAC-banned gamers. We
measure how much cheating adoption is in each group.
Figure 7.8 shows the fraction of players’ engagement in cheating after seeing the cheating label before
matches vs. without any visibility of cheating labels. It turns out that users’ cheating engagement fraction
declines up to 83% (declines from 0.006 to 0.001) after exposure to cheating labels, suggesting that being
reminded of the possibility of punishment (VAC ban labels) has positive effect in containing cheating. More
interestingly, increased pre-exposure times has no prominent effect on adoption, resulting in the same frac-
tion of cheating adoption when exposure frequency increases from one to two. The details of statistics of
warned players involved in this factor are given in Table 7.4.
87
Time	Window	=	0	day	
1	out-team	
3	out-team	
0	
0.05	
0.1	
0.15	
0.2	
0.25	
0.3	
1	in-
team	
2	in-
team	
3	in-
team	
4	in-
team	
1	out-team	
2	out-team	
3	out-team	
4	out-team	
Fr
ac
;o
n	
O
f		
Ch
ea
te
rs
	
Figure 7.4: The cheating adoption results of factor II when time window is zero. The cheating adoption
fraction of players who were exposed to in-team members vs. those who exposed to out-team members
when time window is zero.
7.3.4 Factor IV: Social Class Influences Cheating
We hypothesize that social class is a factor in deciding whether to cheat. Social class is a way to classify
individuals in terms of esteem and prestige acquired through economic success, education and accumulation
of wealth [193, 194]. The role of social class has been of long-standing interest to social scientists to
understand how it can influence people’s thought and behavior. One group of theories sustain that upper-
class individuals are more selfish [195], donate smaller proportion of their incomes to charity [196] than
lower-class people, and they are more likely to engage in unethical behavior than lower-class individuals
[16].
However, most of these studies did not consider the effect of penalties for unethical behavior that ex-
ist in real life and some online communities. We verify Piff’s theory of unethically inclined higher class
individuals in an environment with punishment.
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Figure 7.5: The cheating adoption results of factor II when time window is 7 days. The cheating adoption
fraction of players who were exposed to in-team members vs. those who exposed to out-team members
when time window is 7 days.
We consider the Steam level as an indicator of a player’s social class in the gaming world. The Steam
level is a number that summarizes a player’s gaming skills and obtained badges, shows off trading card
collection and participation in Steam events, etc. Overall, it is a way to know how much time and effort
someone has invested in their Steam account. Players can increase their levels by purchasing games, earning
badges and etc. At the same time, players can gain benefits from higher levels, e.g., players with higher
Steam levels can expand their friendsets to more than 250, which is a limitation for general players.
Next, we describe how to divide Steam players into ten groups. We built a web crawler to collect users’
Steam levels from their profiles. However, because of the privacy settings of user profiles, Steam levels
are available only for users whose profiles are public. Table 7.5 gives the statistics of players’ levels in our
dataset. We group players into different classes according to their value of levels. Specifically, we sort all
users’ Steam levels from high to low, then partition them into ten groups called top x% (the values of levels
in top 0 − 10% are larger than the values in top 10 − 20%), and each group has no overlapped individuals.
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Figure 7.6: The cheating adoption results of factor II when time window is 14 days. The cheating adoption
fraction of players who were exposed to in-team members vs. those who exposed to out-team members
when time window is 14 days.
Naturally, players in the top 0−10% group can be seen as upper-class individuals, and players in the bottom
group (top 90 − 100%) can be seen as lower-class individuals. The first two columns of Table 7.6 give
players’ distribution in each group. A Chi-Square test reveals that the value of levels significantly differs in
each group (χ2(8)=5,865,100, p< 2.2e-16).
Figure 7.9 depicts the relationship between players’ Steam levels and their likelihood of cheating in
each group. We make two key observations from these results. First, globally, players with high levels
demonstrate higher fraction of cheaters, which is consistent with the above theory. However, the lower class
in our dataset presents similar cheating trends as the upper class, having a high fraction of cheaters, which is
inconsistent with the controlled experimental results in [195]. We believe this difference is mainly caused by
the existence of the Steam VAC-ban punishment. A VAC-banned account cannot play on any VAC-secured
servers, cannot trade or sell items, and loses game items. Because of this penalty, players who invested a
large amount of time and money in their accounts usually are careful not to lose them. On the contrary,
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Figure 7.7: The cheating adoption results of factor II when time window is 21 days. The cheating adoption
fraction of players who were exposed to in-team members vs. those who exposed to out-team members
when time window is 21 days.
lower-class individuals are at the initial phase to maintain their accounts, thus less money and efforts have
been put into the accounts (e.g., less weapons/games were bought, less badges and achievements were
gained). Naturally, a VAC-ban is less costly for players who have not much to lose in terms of reputation
or games – they can even abandon the banned account and create a new one. Even if upper-class players’
inventory is several thousands dollars and more than hundreds of hours spent on gaming, according to our
results, upper-class individuals cheat more than other classes even comparable to low-class players.
Second, as the value of levels decrease, the fraction of cheaters declines and reaches the lowest point
at the fifth group, where players’ levels rank in top 41 − 50%. After that, cheating has an upturn, and this
tendency continues as level values further reduce.
These two observations provide strong evidence that in the gaming world with penalty systems, both
high and low classes are more likely to cheat, and the most ethical people appear in the middle class. This
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Figure 7.8: The cheating adoption results of factor III. The cheating adoption fraction of players who were
warned by cheating labels before matches vs. those who had not been warned in scenarios of six different
time windows.
might be the unique feature of the Steam Community caused by the mechanism of VAC ban system, which
could be extended to the real-word cheating behavior when cheating prevention/penalty systems apply.
To exclude some factors that might influence the above analysis other than social class itself, we try
to answer two questions that closely relate to the two variables (fraction of cheaters and values of level)
in Figure 7.9. First, are the value of levels (social classes) mainly influenced by players’ gaming time?
Second, do players have more opportunities to cheat (accordingly the fraction of cheaters is higher), if they
spend longer time in the gaming community? To answer these two questions, we take a closer look at the
correlation between time spent in the gaming world, level values and fraction of cheaters in each group.
Because there is no information available on how much time a player spent playing games, we use each
gamer’s account age to estimate his gaming hours. The account age is defined as the time period between
the creation of the Steam account (marked on Steam Community profiles) and our crawling time, July 15th
2015. Table 7.6 gives two sets of Pearson correlations for each group, i.e., the value of levels vs. account age
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Table 7.4: Summary of players satisfying conditions in factor III. C: Cheater, NC: Non-Cheater.
Condition Time Window Warning Frequncy # of Player
Warned before matches 0 day
0 147,745 (875 C + 146,870 NC)
1 10,760 (39 C + 10,721 NC)
2 1,392 (2 C + 1,390 NC)
Warned before matches 7 days
0 147,362 (492 C + 147,362 NC)
1 12,768 (17 C + 12,751 NC)
2 1,800 (0 C + 1,800 NC)
Warned before matches 14 days
0 147,203 (333 C + 146,870 NC)
1 13,559 (14 C + 13,545 NC)
2 1,993 (0 C + 1,993 NC)
Warned before matches 21 days
0 147,156 (286 C + 146,870 NC)
1 13,841 (11 C + 13,830 NC)
2 2,027 (0 C + 2,027 NC)
Table 7.5: Summary of the dataset of Steam levels.
Influence Users Nodes # of cheaters Range of levels Mean Median
social class friendship + co-match 903,585 58,291 (6.5%) [0, 717] 10.8 8
and fraction of cheaters vs. account age. The low correlation scores show that almost no correlation between
account age and values of level and fraction of cheaters as well. The only exception (cor.=0.2741) happens
with the 10th group (top 90−100%) where players have the lowest value of levels. But this correlation is still
weak. It is reasonable that gaming time has higher influence on value of levels when low-level players have
no other resources like advanced weapons or plenty of virtual coins. Upgrading to higher levels also means
players are equipped with more gaming resources that could dilute the influence of gaming time. Overall,
these results further indicate that players’ gaming time has no strong influence on the value of levels and
fraction of cheaters in each group.
7.3.5 Factor V: Aging of Friendship
We hypothesize that the age of friendship is a factor influence cheating decision making. We are inter-
ested in the relationship between the age of friendship and cheating propagation. Is Cheating more likely to
spread via “old” or newly formed relationships?
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Figure 7.9: Distribution of cheaters in different social status. Fraction of cheaters in different groups where
players are divided into ten social classes according to their level values. The shaded area represents the
95% confidence interval.
We try to answer the above question by analyzing friendship duration of each pair of users in the friend-
ship network. Here the friendship duration is also called friendship age, which is defined as the time duration
from the creation of the friendship to the end of our observation time. We propose to analyze the function
of friendship age on cheating contagion with the following two types of edges: cheater-cheater (C-C) and
cheaters-noncheater (C-NC) edges. Specifically, in each type of edges, we look at players’ friendship age
and when two players were flagged as cheaters. There are three time points, t1 and t2 are times when two
players were detected as cheaters, and t3 is the friendship creation time. Blackburn et al. [144] found that
in pairs of eventual cheaters, 90% friendships were formed before either were cheaters in steam community,
and cheating behavior spreads along social ties rather than social ties connect cheaters. Based on this dis-
covery, we only consider edges satisfy the condition, max(t1, t2) > t3, i.e., friendship formed before both
end users are detected as cheaters. Otherwise, it is difficult to decide the function of friendship age in the
influence of cheating adoption.
Table 7.7 provides the statistics for C-C and C-NC edges where only 7.7% edges are C-C edges that have
much larger mean and median value of friendship age than the C-NC edges. We plot the density distribution
of these two types of edges in Figure 7.10 to further observe which type of edges have longer friendship
duration. A density curve is the graph of a continuous probability distribution, and the total area under the
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Table 7.6: The Pearson correlation of excluded factors. The Pearson correlation in top x% levels. Correla-
tion 1: level vs. account age, Correlation 2: frac. of cheaters vs. account age
Top % Level # of players Correlation 1 P-Value Correlation 2 P-Value
0-10% 33 -0.0250 0.8919 0.0037 0.9841
10-20% 44 0.0661 0.6738 -0.0592 0.7060
20-30% 58 0.1515 0.2652 -0.2036 0.1323
30-40% 104 -0.0931 0.3543 -0.0898 0.3721
40-50% 203 0.0089 0.9016 -0.0719 0.3153
50-60% 431 -0.0206 0.6723 0.0162 0.7395
60-70% 1,619 -0.0550 0.0287 0.0049 0.8445
70-80% 6,448 0.0046 0.7153 -0.0088 0.4833
80-90% 73,631 0.0044 0.2365 -0.0309 < 2.2e-16
90-100% 821,014 0.2741 < 2.2e-16 -0.0665 < 2.2e-16
Table 7.7: Summary of statistics of two types of edges analyzed. Friendship Age Range: FAR
Edge Type # of edge FAR (days) Mean (days) Median (days)
Cheater-Cheater (C-C) 417,884 [71-2,510] 711.5 518
Cheater-Noncheater (C-NC) 5,399,977 [1-2,511] 601.6 393
density curve is equal to 1. The area equals the probability of observing a value within that range. From
the density distribution, we see that almost no C-C edges exist when friendship age is less than 71 days,
i.e., cheating seldom spreads through newly formed edges. This can also be confirmed by the third column
of Table 7.7. Later, after a certain point (around 200 days), the probability of observing C-C edges are
larger than C-NC edges but this trend does not continue when friendship becomes even older. All in all,
“old” friendship is more effective for influencing neighbors to engage in cheating while this old relationship
has a certain range, if beyond the range, it is hardly to observe any correlation between friendship age and
cheating contagion. In other words, this tendency suggests that as relationships between players deepened,
players become more comfortable with their friends, they are also more easier to identify with or accept
their friends’ behavior based on the trust that their relationships have engendered.
7.3.6 Factor VI: Neighborhood Structure
We hypothesize that an individual’s cheater neighborhood structure has an impact on cheating conta-
gion. Our previous work [83] and Section 7.2 suggest that the probability of social contagion should grow
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Figure 7.10: Density curve distributions. The density curve compares distributions of friendship ages be-
tween cheater-cheater (C-C) and cheater-noncheater (C-NC) in the friendship network. In C-C edges, all
players changed to cheaters after their friendship formations.
monotonically in the size of the cheater neighborhood. However, the contagion of cheating is also controlled
by how cheater neighbors are connected. Here, we go beyond the number of infected neighborhood, looking
at connection structures among infected neighbors.
We employed three metrics—clustering coefficient, density, connected component—in graph theory to
measure a node’s neighborhood connectivity. We performed our analysis on the large friendship network
with all the three metrics in three steps. First,we extracted a player’s neighbors that only include cheaters.
Next, we built a new graph called neighborhood graph for each player where nodes are the player’s cheater
neighbors and edges are connections among these cheater neighbors. Note that this neighborhood graph does
not include the node itself and its non-cheater neighbors. Finally, we calculate values of the neighborhood
graph’s clustering coefficient, density and number of connected component.
The left of Figure 7.11 plots the relationship between clustering coefficient of cheater neighborhood
graph and fraction of cheaters. We see that clustering coefficient has no discernible effect in cheating
engagement. The right of Figure 7.11 plots the relationship between cheater neighborhood graph’s edge
density and fraction of cheaters. We observed an interesting phenomenon that when edge density is smaller
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than 0.55, a linear distribution are presented but after that no meaningful distribution can be found in the
later part of the distribution. Further, as Ugander et al. [197] suggested, component counts is an effective
factor driving people to join Facebook. We also look at the component counts in our data but compared
to Ugander et al. small neighborhood size (<= 10), we examine much larger neighbor sizes, which can
show the subtle structural signals that are hard be to observe at small scales. Figure 7.12 and Figure 7.13
plot the relationship between number of neighborhood graph’s connected components and the cheaters’
fraction with relative small and large samples, respectively. From the two distributions, it becomes clear that
neighborhoods consisting of small size of cheaters, the number of connected component primarily indicates
the conversion from non-cheaters to cheaters while the cheater neighborhood size exceeds 40, component
counts are not a factor influencing cheating decision making any more.
We interpret all these observations with the complex contagion theory introduced in Chapter 2. The
complex contagion needs exposure to multiple sources instead of multiple times from the same source.
Each connected component of an individual’s cheater neighborhood can be treated as a potentially dis-
tinct social circle in that individual’s life. If a player has more connected components with the same size
of cheater neighbors, the player exposes to more different social circles, which satisfies the condition of
complex contagion. However, this exploration is valid only when the size of cheater neighbors is not too
large. When an individual’s neighborhood size becomes large, a number of other factors can constrain the
contagion, such as visibility and information overload. The visibility of cheating behavior could decays as
the number of new friends grows. Users with large number of neighbors are difficult to be “activated” by
its neighbors because exposure to heterogeneous information from different subnetworks makes them less
likely develop extreme attitudes [198]. Additionally, information overload has a dramatic impact on limiting
users’ adoption probability [199].
7.4 Summary and Discussions
This paper presents a data-driven study of the factors that contribute to an online game player to adopt
the cheating behavior of a neighbor in the social network. Our datasets include most of popular games from
different companies, which represent behavior in general for gaming. Although the dataset gives us a unique
opportunity to study influential factors behind unethical behavior, it has several limitations. First, because
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Figure 7.11: Results of clustering coefficient. Fraction of cheaters as a function of clustering coefficient of
cheater neighborhoods where variations in clustering coefficient have no meaningful difference in change
of fraction of cheaters (left). Fraction of cheaters as a function of edge density of cheater neighborhoods
(right). The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval.
of the delay between the cheating time and the application of the VAC ban, we do not have the exact time
of when a player cheats. But by using different time windows, covering all possible delay slots from days
to weeks, we can approximate the evolution of cheating behavior in the network. Second, it is difficult to
trace in which match a cheater was caught, and we do not know how many times a player cheated before
being marked as a cheater on his profile. Thus, we estimate the number of players who witnessed cheating
by counting all users who played with the cheater before his cheating label was shown. Third, a user may
vaguely be aware of the cheating labels on his friends’ profiles. It is possible that some players focused only
on gaming seldom check their partners’ or opponents’ profiles, or they check these profiles after the match.
A typical concern in this type of data-driven analysis is distinguishing between homophily and influ-
ence [200,201]. In this case, however, we note that the influence of cheating has been confirmed in environ-
ments where users cannot express homophilious preferences, such as attendance of particular universities or
a military service academy in the US. Thus, we are inclined to believe that the same phenomenon is at play
in online gaming, and thus the observations we made are not the result of homophily but rather of influence.
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Figure 7.12: Fraction of cheaters as a function of connected components I. An illustration of the number of
connected component in a relative small friendship neighborhood and the corresponding fraction of cheaters.
Eight types of cheater neighbors are sampled.
Even if our datasets have limitations, our study represents an important step towards evaluating hypothe-
ses of adoption of unethical behavior on network data of this scale, and provides a better understanding of
cheating behavior and its influential factors.
Further, the influences of factors we discussed in this chapter also would be involved in the design of
anti-cheating systems that help improve limiting the spread of unwanted behavior for the gaming industry.
In the following, we give two strategies and use Steam Community and the VAC ban system as examples.
First, as the VAC ban system in Steam delayed the cheating flag to prevent hackers from understanding
its detection methods, in-game observers have opportunities to witness others’ cheating behavior without
punishment in a certain time interval. This leads to more honest players changed their behavior toward
cheating as discussed in Factor I. To improve the VAC ban system, we could leverage the influences of
Factor I and Factor II in the design of the system. That is, immediate alerts or announcements to observers,
especially teammates, have potential for restricting cheating propagation. Specifically, if the VAC ban sys-
tem detects a cheating behavior, it immediately pops up a warning window to all other in-match observers
(teammates or opponents), saying “your teammates or opponents cheating behavior is detected and will be
punished”. We believe such a warning mechanism could decrease the chance for other players observing
unpunished cheaters and contain the spread of cheating, especially for in-team observers.
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Figure 7.13: Fraction of cheaters as a function of connected components II. An illustration of the number of
connected component in a relative large friendship neighborhood and the corresponding fraction of cheaters.
Eight types of cheater neighbors are sampled.
Second, encouraging good behavior rather than only focusing on punishing the bad. Accordingly to
our analysis of factor IV, in the VAC ban system, Valve could design different reward policies for players
in different social status to maximize cheating restriction. The VAC ban system also gives a reward for
players’ good behavior and gives players more of an incentive to strive towards getting them. For example,
the system could accelerate upgrading low-status players’ levels to middle status if players continue showing
non-cheating behavior at the initial phase after creating their accounts but slow down the upgrade for middle-
status players. This strategy might help decrease the fraction of cheating engagement for new players who
are more likely to cheat in the previous system.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we first summarize our work on social ties in dynamic networks. Then we share our
lessons learned from our work to provide useful guidelines for other researchers working in this area. Finally,
we discuss future directions that we will pursue.
8.1 Summary
A growing number of large-scale user behavior data become available due to the recent emergence of
web and rich social computing applications. Such data collected from real world not only provide computer
scientists a unique opportunity to empirically study social science theories but also design and build novel
systems or applications by utilizing social knowledge. This dissertation presents a combination of empirical
measurements, experiments and applied machine learning tools, and design of algorithms and systems based
on data-driven analysis.
The research focus of this thesis is to analyze and model social ties in the structure, evolution and
dynamics of real-world networks. The contributions are three fold. First, to investigate the exact influence
of indirect ties in social networks, we proposed a metric to calculate indirect ties’ social strength. The
metric is called social strength and quantifies social ties numerically. Many times, people extend their
network through friends of friends, meaning indirect ties are the driving force for the formation of direct ties.
Meanwhile, everyday large amounts of new links are created in the network thus link formation prediction
is a fundamental problem for dynamic network study. We verified the effectiveness of our social strength
metric in quantifying indirect ties’ strength by reframing it to the link prediction problem. Through our
experiments on social graphs from different domains, we show that using social strength, the formation of
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new links between two indirectly connected users can be accurately estimated. This link prediction can be
extended to even longer social distance (e.g., 3-hop indirected connected users).
Next, we studied dynamics from two perspectives: structural evolutions and information flow or behav-
ior spread in the network. Given the measurement of indirect ties from our previous study, we first analyzed
the timing of link formation at two networks representing friendship and interaction networks, and in online
and offline networks. Via the measurement we observe the “speed” of link formation positively correlates
to the strength of the tie between two end users. As different tie strengths indicate different interactions, we
then studied interaction intensity along newly formed links. We discovered that interaction intensity also
relates to tie strength, i.e., stronger tie strength before a link formed also brings more interactions after the
link formed. Then, we go a step further to study the influence of indirect ties in information diffusion paths.
Our work differs from previous studies that departing from the step-wise diffusion processes examined in
the past, we predict which users will receive the information at 2- or 3-hop away from the last spreader.
Predictions over such longer intervals could help us customize strategies for preventing or accelerating in-
formation spreading. To predict diffusion paths over indirect ties, we designed a path prediction algorithm.
Using both simulations and a real-world event diffusion process from Twitter, we demonstrated that the
influence of indirect ties in information diffusion cannot be ignored.
Further, discovering the power of indirect ties in dynamic networks is not the final goal of our study
but utilizing the knowledge we found to design novel applications or systems. Based on our previous
observations that indirect ties can be accurately quantified and they have significant impact on future link
formation prediction, we designed an augmented friend-to-friend (F2F) system, aiming at solving two well-
known problems that caused poor quality of service. Using authors of co-authorship and players of TF2
gaming networks as peers in F2F, we proposed a data placement algorithm that recruits socially distant peers
as data placement candidates based on the social strength between the user and those peers’ contacts. We
show that the social strength-based data placement more than doubles the set of service candidates motivated
by social incentives, invites socially low connected users to contribute significantly more resources, and
improves data availability consequently. We also show that simple strategies can significantly improve peer
engagement and workload distribution in social strength-based F2F systems.
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Last, we tackle factors that influence people’s behavior in cheating. Social contagion has been a long-
term research topic in sociology and psychology while cheating behavior and its inherent factors are hard
to be captured in real life. Thus the majority of previous studies relied on random trials, surveys, and in-
lab controlled experiments with small samples, which might ignore certain factors or behavior patterns that
only emerge or become visible in large datasets. We collected a large-scale dataset that includes a signifi-
cant number of instances of cheating behavior from the Steam community the world’s most popular online
gaming platform. Our theoretical and empirical analysis on online gaming cheating behavior evaluated six
hypotheses of adoption of unethical behavior, and provides a better understanding of cheating behavior and
its inherent influential factors.
8.2 Lessons and Future Work
My work introduced novel solutions to three problems in dynamic networks, and also gained several
lessons through studying the problems. In this section, we discuss lessons we learned and potential direc-
tions in applying indirect ties and analyzing and modeling the dynamic process of social networks. We
summarize them as follows:
8.2.1 Computation Costs with Large Graphs
Even if the social strength metric does not need graph’s global information for calculation, the running
time of finding a node’s 2-hop neighbors is O (n2) and O (n3) for 3-hop neighbors (n is number of nodes
in the graph). In extremely dense graphs, 2- or 3-hop traversal could reach all other nodes in the graph. A
graph with millions of nodes and billions of edges, the computing cost of social strength can be very high.
This is a big obstacle for both graph analysis and real-time applications using indirect ties.
Because of the fast evolution of networks, links and interactions update frequently. Our algorithms
also need to adapt to such dramatic changes in big real graphs, and we hope it performs near real-time
analysis. We plan to explore Spark type programming frameworks for large-scale computing and extend our
algorithms to distributed architectures.
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8.2.2 More Accurate Measurement
The current social strength metric uses both edge weights and number of paths to calculate a value,
which is sensitive to strength differences compared to other metrics in literature such as Jaccard Coefficient,
Adamic Adar, etc. But this sensitivity is not enough because of two reasons. First, by far we only consider
basic graph information (e.g., paths and edge weights) in our metric but have not incorporated other richer
information like node attributes or built multi-graphs. Such advanced graph attributes allow for more accu-
rate measurement of indirect ties. Second, for more than 2-hop social strength value, we only consider the
shortest path length between two end nodes instead of all possible paths. That is, we ignore all 3-hop, or
4-hop paths if two nodes have a 2-hop shortest path. Although such ignorance can simplify the calculation
but in somehow will weaken the accuracy of the measurement. In future, we plan to improve the sensitivity
of strength differences of social strength metric without bringing more computations.
8.2.3 Curbing the “Poor Get Poorer, Rich Get Richer” Phenomenon
As we described in Chapter 6, indirect ties can be used for expanding a peer’s available resource holders
in F2F systems. Accordingly, a data placement algorithm was proposed to solve the low data availability
problem. However, for “poor” users, indirect ties might have no effect on expanding their friendsets because
of no more available candidates. In contrast, “rich” users already have lots of directly connected relation-
ships, indirect connections will burden their selection. For these two extreme cases, we need to adjust our
strategies for applying social strength metrics. A simple solution is that in the data placement algorithm,
we lower the threshold for poor users but increase it for rich users. My next step is to refine the algorithm
of expanding people’s relationships by using social strength, customizing different strategies for different
individuals.
8.2.4 Indirect Tie-Based Applications
As shown in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, indirect ties can be used in link prediction, information
diffusion, and F2F-like systems. In the future, we will explore more applications that indirect ties are able
to mine more hidden information. In the following, we discuss two potential applications, social search and
malicious attacks.
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8.2.4.1 Leverage Indirect Ties for Social Search
Social search is a form of web search based on social graphs, which allows you to easily find content
created by your friends, collages or family. A user’s online media account can be exploited by search engines
to provide highly personalized results. Such as Facebook’s Graph Search and the search of Google+. While
social search is known for suffering from two drawbacks, lacking of enough search candidates and privacy
issues.
To solve these problems, we consider to incorporate social strength metric and the indirect tie selection
algorithm in social search. We could add new edges in the original graph according to the strength of
indirect ties between two users, i.e., new edges are the strong indirect relations that comparable to direct
ties, and new edges could be directional. Now the augmented graph is like the structure of webpages linked
on the web. Thus, PageRank or other link ranking metrics can still be used to rank users connections, and
finally navigate online search. Because of adding new edges to the graph, users should have more social
candidates for search, and more candidates could lead to better search results. Meanwhile, after adding
edges to the graph, the graph becomes denser and has smaller diameters than before, thus search speed
could be improved.
In parallel, because of the asymmetric attribute of social strength, social strength-based search is able to
protect users’ privacy, especially for sensitive contents search. Specifically, we could map the asymmetric
social trust from social strength to search paths in the graph, i.e., user A allows user B’s search go through
A because A trusts B, while B does not allow A’s search paths involve B as B does not trust A enough.
Therefore, compared to previous bidirectional social search, our social strength-based search provides better
privacy protection for users.
8.2.4.2 Mitigate Sybil Attacks via Indirect Ties
Sybil attacks refer to malicious users joining the system under multiple identities [202] in order to
control the system or collect information. In literature, a large body of studies used social graph attributes
to mitigate Sybil attacks and typically exploit the intuition that regardless of how many Sybil identities a
malicious user creates, it can only establish limited number of edges between honest nodes and Sybil nodes.
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Based on this assumption, a practical solution is maintaining directed, weighted, labeled multi-graphs as
proposed in Prometheus [203] instead of simple undirected graphs. The edge weights could be aggregated
from user interactions, conversation duration, or shared common interests; edges are labeled according to
the type of social interaction; and edge directions indicate directed interactions. The principle here is that
adversaries have to maintain significant levels of interactions with legitimate users over a period of time for
getting appropriate edge weights and proper edge labels, otherwise adversaries influence in the network is
limited. Quantitative studies [204,205] prove that a directed, weighted, labeled multi-graph is more resilient
to attacks caused by manipulating the underlying social graph.
After building the directed, weighted, labeled multi-graph, social strength can be applied to help a user
decide whether a friend request from a stranger who shares common friends with him should be accepted
or not. While building meaningful multi-graphs is not always possible in many practical scenarios, such
solution is restricted by obtaining (or collecting) rich information of graph nodes. All in all, how to design
a simple yet practical system for Sybil detection is our future work.
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Appendix A: Permission For Reuse and Data Summary
Below is permission for the use of material in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.
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Appendix A (Continued)
Below is permission for the use of material in Chapter 5.
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Below is permission for the use of material in Chapter 6.
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